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Procedure to Actions

Brought by the Equal
Employment Opportunity
Commission
T. Merritt Bumpass, Jr.*

The 1972 amendments to title Vl permittedthe EqualEmployment Opportunity
Commission to institute actions infederal district courts basedupon charges of discriminationfliedpursuant to section 706 of the CivilJRightsAct. These suits brought
by the Commission have resembled class actions, and in response employers have
demandedtheproceduralprotectionsandjudicialcontrols affordedby rule 23 of the
FederalRules of CivilProcedur- The author examines the legislative history of the
1972 amendments andfids persuasive supportfor a conclusion that Congress did
not intend to exempt section 706 actions by the Commissionfrom the applicationof
the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, including rule 23. He explores the relevant
policy considerationsandnotes their applicabilityto section 707 actions as well The
author concludes that theproceduralprerequisitesofrule 23 arenecessarytoprotect
the substantive rights of employers and should be applied to both section 706 and
section 707 actions.
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The Application of Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to Actions

Brought by the Equal
Employment Opportunity
Commission
INTRODUCTION

IN

RECENT YEARS federal courts have rendered a number of
decisions concerning the question of whether the provisions of
rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the class action
rule, apply to suits brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, as amended in 1972.1 The issue has not been decided
uniformly; its ultimate resolution holds important ramifications,

not only for how the EEOC will prosecute its lawsuits, but also for
how such actions may affect substantive rights. This article examines the legislative background of this issue and analyzes the considerations and arguments which have been, or at least should be,
raised in resolving it.
I.

LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL BACKGROUND

As originally enacted, title VII created a cause of action on
behalf of individuals who had suffered discrimination proscribed
by the statute.2 The original statutory language did not authorize
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970), as amendedby Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (EEOA), Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 2-13, 86 Stat. 103.
2. Section 706 of title VII originally stated in part:
If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission or within
thirty days after expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) ...
the Commission has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance with this title,
the Commission shall so notify the person aggrieved and a civil action may,
within thirty days thereafter, be brought against the respondent named in the
charge (1) by the person claiming to be aggrieved, or (2) if such charge was filed
by a member of the Commission, by any person whom the charge alleges was
aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment practice.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(e), 78 Stat. 260 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)
(1976)).
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the EEOC to initiate actions concerning violations of the Act. Instead, the Commission was limited to investigating charges filed
with it, making findings with respect to such charges, and seeking
voluntary elimination of any unlawful employment practices uncovered. 3 The Commission was authorized only to institute actions to compel compliance with court orders already issued
against an employer, employment agency, or labor organization. a
The original language of title VII did authorize the United States
Attorney General to bring "pattern or practice" suits5 and to intervene, with the court's permission, in civil actions brought by individuals if the Attorney General certified that such actions were of
general public importance.6
These statutory provisions permitted only minimal governmental assistance for aggrieved individuals, and Congress responded in 1972 by amending title VII. Section 706 was amended
to permit the EEOC to institute actions in federal district court
based upon charges which had been filed with the Commission.7
The EEOC was also given the authority to intervene, with the
court's permission, in civil actions brought by individuals against
defendants other than governments, governmental agencies, or
political subdivisions upon certification by the EEOC that the actions were of general public importance.8 Individuals were accorded the right to intervene in actions brought by the EEOC or
3. See id § 706(a), 78 Stat. 259 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1976)).
4. Id § 706(i), 78 Stat. 261 (current version at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(i) (1976)).
5. Section 707 of title VII originally provided in part:
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person
or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full
enjoyment of any of the rights secured by this title, and that the pattern or practice is of such a nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of rights herein
described, the Attorney General may bring a civil action in the appropriate district court of the United States. ...
Id § 707(a), 78 Stat. 261 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1976)).
6. Id 706(e), 78 Stat. 260 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976)).
7. Section 706 has been amended to read as follows:
If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission or within thirty
days after expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d) ...
the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation
agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent not a government, governmental agency, or political
subdivision named in the charge. In the case of a respondent which is a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, if the Commission has been
unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the
Commission, the Commission shall take no further action and shall refer the case
to the Attorney General who may bring a civil action against such respondent in
the appropriate United States district court.
EEOA § 4(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976) (amending U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1970)).
8. Id
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the Attorney General.9 Moreover, individuals who had filed
charges could still bring civil actions if the EEOC had not filed its
own action based on such charges or had not entered into conciliation agreements concerning them.'" Finally, the 1972 amendments transferred the Attorney General's pattern or practice
authority to the EEOC.'
Since 1972, the EEOC has actively pursued section 706 actions
against private employers. These actions have usually been based
upon broadly framed complaints which attack a variety of employment practices and which seek injunctive and monetary relief
on behalf of considerable numbers of employees.
At least as early as 1974, employers began to urge federal district courts to apply the provisions of rule 23 12 to these section 706
9. Id
10. Id
11. Section 707(e), the language of which follows, is one of three subsections added to
§ 707 of title VII:
Subsequent to the date of enactment of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, the Commission shall have authority to investigate and act on a
charge of a pattern or practice of discrimination, whether filed by or on behalf of
a person claiming to be aggrieved or by a member of the Commission. All such
actions shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in section
706 of this Act.
Id § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e)(1976) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1970)). Until two
years after enactment of the 1972 amendments, the Attorney General retained concurrent
authority to institute § 707 actions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c) (1976) (originally enacted as
EEOA, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 5(c), 86 Stat. 107).
12. FED. R. Ctv. P. 23(a) and 23(b) provide:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Action Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate filial injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
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actions in an attempt to secure the procedural protections and judicial controls afforded by the rule. 3 The majority of the district
courts which have considered this issue have held that section 706
actions brought by the EEOC are not subject to the burden of
complying with the requirements of rule 23.'" Unfortunately,
many of the opinions which have dealt with this issue have contained little analysis concerning their results.
Only one appellate court has considered the applicability of
rule 23 to EEOC actions. In EEOC v. D.H. Holmes Co.,15 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that when the EEOC brings a
section 706 action it must comply with rule 23. The court indicated, however, that the EEOC could bring a section 707 pattern
or practice action without having to comply with rule 23.16
In EEOC v. DatapointCorp.,17 the Fifth Circuit confirmed the
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution
or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C)
the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in
the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
13. See EEOC v. Lutheran Hosp., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 117 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
14. EEOC v. Singer Controls Co. of America, 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 309 (N.D.
Ohio 1978); EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 206 (D. Md.
1978); EEOC v. Schlueter Mfg. Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 53 (E.D. Mo. 1978); EEOC v.
Whirlpool Corp., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 932 (N.D. Ind. 1978); EEOC v. General Tel.
Co., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 476 (W.D. Wash. 1977); EEOC v. Pinkerton's Inc., 14 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1431 (W.D. Pa. 1977); EEOC v. CTS, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 852
(W.D.N.C. 1976); EEOC v. Vinnel-Dravo-Lockheed-Mannix, 417 F. Supp. 575, 12 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1815 (E.D. Wash. 1976); Stuart v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 66 F.R.D. 73, 9
Empl. Prac. Dec. 9993 (E.D. Mich. 1975); EEOC v. Lutheran Hosp., 10 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 1177 (E.D. Mo. 1974). See also EEOC v. Avco New Idea Div., 18 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 311 (N.D. Ohio 1978); EEOC v. Rexene Polymers Co., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 61
(W.D. Tex. 1975); EEOC v. Mobil Oil Corp., 362 F. Supp. 786, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 727
(W.D. Mo. 1973).
District court decisions in which rule 23 has been held to apply to § 706 actions include:
EEOC v. Delaware Trust Co., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1521 (D. Del. 1979); EEOC v. Page
Eng'r Co., 17 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. 1638 (N.D. Ill. 1978); EEOC v. Akron Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 78 F.R.D. 684, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 636 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Niedhardt v.
D.H. Holmes Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 449 (E.D. La. 1976), aff'd, EEOC v. D.H.
Holmes Co., 556 F.2d 787, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 378 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 962, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1000 (1978); and EEOC v. Continental Oil Co., 393 F.
Supp. 167 (D. Colo. 1975), af'd on other grounds,548 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1977). See also
EEOC v. Datapoint Corp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1133 (W.D. Tex. 1975), qff'd in part,
570 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1978).
15. 556 F.2d 787, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 378 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
962 (1978).
16. 556 F.2d at 792 n.8, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 382 n.8.
17. 570 F.2d 1264, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 281 (5th Cir. 1978).
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Holmes decision. It held that the district court had not erred in
certifying the EEOC under rule 23 as the representative of a class
of past and present employees, and in thereby binding all members of the class to the court's determination that the defendant's
employment practices had not discriminated against minorities or
females.

II.

CONGRESSIONAL INTENT CONCERNING SECTION
ACTIONS BROUGHT BY THE

706

EEOC

It is undeniable that many of the section 706 actions which
have been prosecuted by the EEOC resemble class actions. In
such suits, the EEOC has sought to obtain monetary and injunctive relief on behalf of sizable classes of past, present, and future
employees. It has drafted both the substantive allegations and the
requests for relief in its complaints with great generality.' 8
Recognition of the resemblance between EEOC actions and
18. For example, in Holmes, the court of appeals concluded that the EEOC suit was a
"class action" for the following reasons:
First, there are the pleadings themselves. The complaint is very broadly and
vaguely drawn. It names no employee adversely affected by unlawful discharge,
promotion, or other employment policy. Nor does it name any employee opposing such alleged practices who has been harrassed as a result. It does not specify
at which of the nine stores or in which of the 494 departments alleged violations
of the Civil Rights Act took place. It does not name particular dates on which
these alleged violations occurred. Instead, the complaint is drawn in the broadest
terms so as to include all female employees, all nine stores, all 494 departments,
and every day from July 2, 1965 (the effective date of the Civil Rights Act) to the
present.
Furthermore, the request for relief is likewise drawn with great generality.
We pass over the prayer for injunctive relief as, class action or not, the practical
effect of an injunction is likely to be the same. But we do pause at the prayer for
back pay. Such relief is sought on behalf of all "those persons adversely affected." We can only assume this to mean that relief, if granted, is to run in favor
of a class of beneficiaries defined somehow by their relationship to the wrongs
alleged. If this complaint and prayer do not amount to a "class action," we are at
a loss to know what does.
556 F.2d at 793, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 382-83 (citations omitted). The court also
relied upon the EEOC's course of discovery and its opposition to Holmes' motion to dismiss the class action aspects of the suit in concluding that the suit was a "class action."
In EEOC v. Akron Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 78 F.R.D. 684, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
636 (N.D. Ohio 1978), the Commission sued on behalf of females employed at 23 of the
defendant's facilities on the basis of a variety of alleged title VII violations. In that case
and in EEOC v. Page Eng'r Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1638 (N.D. Ill. 1978), the EEOC
admitted that it was seeking class relief. Id. at 1639. EEOC v. Akron Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 78 F.R.D. at 685, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 637. In EEOC v. Whirlpool Corp., 16
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 932 (N.D. Ind. 1978), the court noted that title VII actions brought
by the EEOC are "by definition, in the nature of a class action." Id at 939. But see EEOC
v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 206 (D. Md. 1978); EEOC v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 727 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
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traditional class actions merely begins any inquiry concerning the
propriety of applying rule 23 to such actions. The next step is an
examination of the legislative history of the 1972 amendments in
order to determine whether Congress indicated any special intention regarding this issue. Surprisingly, most courts which have
been called upon to decide whether rule 23 should be applied to
EEOC suits have made no such examination. Moreover, those
courts which have considered Congress' intent have done so in a
cursory fashion.' 9
The EEOC contended in its unsuccessful petition for certiorari
in Holmes that the 1972 legislative history is silent on the question
of Congress' intent concerning the application of rule 23 to Commission 706 actions. 20 In fact, the legislative history of the 1972
amendments is far from silent on this issue. A thorough inquiry
reveals that Congress intended that the provisions of rule 23
would apply to section 706 actions brought by the EEOC. Several
congressmen expressly stated during the debates that such actions
would be subject to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in general and to rule 23 in particular; no congressman expressed a contrary view.
A.

Context of CongressionalDebate

During the congressional debate on the 1972 amendments,
both the House and the Senate considered at great length whether
the EEOC should be given enforcement powers by granting it the
authority either to issue administrative cease-and-desist orders or
to sue in federal district court.2 ' In the context of this debate, supporters of both approaches made many statements of varying
levels of clarity and pertinence to the rule 23 issue. In the aggregate these statements indicate clearly that Congress contemplated
that the provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including rule 23, would be applicable to section 706 actions.
The proponents of the court-enforcement approach wanted to
19. See, e.g., EEOC v. Schlueter Mfg. Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 53 (E.D. Mo.
1978).
20. Petition for Certiorari at 9, 15, EEOC v. D.H. Holmes Co., 436 U.S. 962 (1978)
(cert. denied) [hereinafter cited as Petition for Certiorari].

21. See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 118, 248, 279, 589, 645, 690 (Comm. Print 1972) [hereinafter cited as
EEOA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
mately adopted.

The court-enforcement approach, of course, was ulti-
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secure a forum that would ensure employers a fair hearing.22
These legislators argued that enforcement through court actions
was essential in order to guarantee employers "due process"23 and
a "fair trial."24 They perceived a Commission bias in favor of
charging parties,2 5 and were concerned that under the cease-anddesist approach investigatory, prosecutory, and decisionmaking
authority would be consolidated in the Commission. 26 They argued that only federal court proceedings could provide the necessary procedural safeguards and a fair trial.27
Supporters of the court-enforcement approach frequently referred to the Commission's enforcement of title VII within the
framework of the existing "federal court machinery" or the "federal judicial system."2 8 Also, two senators argued that Commission suits should be handled by federal courts in the same manner
as courts have long handled other actions. 29 One proponent of the
alternative cease-and-desist approach complained that the courtenforcement approach would not offer aggrieved parties anything
which they did not already possess since their disputes were already channelled to federal courts for decision. 30 It stands to reason that the congressmen who expressed such sentiments
contemplated that the existing judicial "machinery" or "system"
22. See id at 690, 695, 779, 782, 794, 797, 806, 837, 992, 1110, 1272-81, 1467, 1533.
23. Id at 682, 797, 808, 1270-71, 1347, 1418, 1443, 1546.
24. Id at 1694 (remarks of Sen. Ervin).
25. Id at 119, 696, 698, 807, 810, 838, 991, 1027, 1290, 1314, 1533; see id at 688, 795,
1012-13, 1367.
26. Id at 696-99, 796, 808-10, 838, 841, 905, 974-77, 986, 991-94, 1027-28, 1270,
1309, 1418, 1441, 1546, 1595.
27. Id at 122, 201, 226, 229, 278, 976, 988-89. As will be discussed in detail later, the
application of the provisions of rule 23 to actions brought by the Commission does trigger
certain procedural safeguards that would not otherwise exist. See text accompanying note
157 infra. For example, two district courts have asserted, though without adequate justification, that the application of rule 23 to Commission actions would have such a significant
impact that it would frustrate congressional policy. EEOC v. Schlueter Mfg. Co., 17 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 53 (E.D. Mo. 1978); EEOC v. General Tel. Co., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
476 (W.D. Wash. 1977). See note 108 infra. To the extent that rule 23 does impose such
procedural safeguards, its application provides employers with a fairer forum than they
would otherwise enjoy and thus can be said to satisfy a purpose vigorously pursued by
proponents of the court-enforcement approach. A clear indication that employers believe
that the application of rule 23 accords them fairer proceedings is evidenced by the fact that
most reported decisions concerning the application of rule 23 to EEOC suits have arisen in
the context of motions filed by employers seeking to have district courts apply the provisions of rule 23 to EEOC actions.
28. EEOA LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY, supra note 21, at 549, 688, 694, 697, 794-95, 838,
1012-13, 1319; see id at 698-99, 1550-51.
29. Id at 678 (remarks of Sen. Dominick); see id at 806-08 (remarks of Sen. Allen).
30. Id at 263-64 (remarks of Rep. O'Hara).
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which was ultimately adopted by Congress as an enforcement
mechanism would include the application of established and customarily applied rules of civil procedure.
Proponents of the cease-and-desist approach also indicated
that they understood that the Rules of Civil Procedure would apply to Commission suits if the court-enforcement approach were
adopted. They argued that one advantage of cease-and-desist enforcement of civil rights would be that proceedings in administrative agencies are less subject to "technical rules" than are those
heard by courts.3 It is reasonable to assume that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were among the "technical rules" that
these supporters of the cease-and-desist approach proposed to
avoid.
B.

Specific References During Debate to
Rules of Civil Procedure

On several occasions congressmen on both sides of the issue
expressly stated that they thought that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in general, and rule 23 in particular, would be applied
to actions brought by the Commission under section 706. In the
House of Representatives, the Committee on Education and Labor reported favorably upon H.R. 1746,32 the House version of the
1972 amendments which initially incorporated the cease-and-desist approach.3 3 In the Committee's report the minority members
argued for a court-enforcement mechanism, noting that "[tihe district court approach has a great advantage over the administrative
hearing procedure" and that the use of the discovery provisions of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "would greatly facilitate the
collection of evidence for trial." 34 Ultimately, of course, the minority view with respect to the method of enforcement prevailed
in the House as well as in the Senate.
At one point in the Senate proceedings, Senator Allen offered,
on Senator Ervin's and his behalf, a substitute bill that was identical to the court-enforcement bill passed by the House.3 5 Senator
Javits, the ranking minority member of the Senate committee
which had reported on a cease-and-desist bill and a leading proponent of the cease-and-desist approach, described the Allen-Er31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id at 71, 196, 238, 861-62; see id at 1367.
H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
EEOA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 61, 68.
Id at 122.
Id at 989-90, 1005-06.
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vin substitute as nothing more than a "'re-do' of the Dominick
amendment" which had already been voted on five times by the
Senate and had not been passed. 36 Senator Ervin said of the
amendment offered by Senator Allen:
I hope that this substitute amendment will be agreed to. It provides that we will have enforcement in the courts. It affords an
adequate procedure by which the EEOC, suing at the expense
of the American taxpayers, can have a right of vindication in
rules of procedure and
the court according to the established
37
the established rules of evidence.
Approximately two weeks later during the course of the Senate
debate, Senator Dominick argued on behalf of his amendment
which was ultimately adopted 38 by the Senate:
[W]e must retain a belief in this country that the Federal district courts provide a method of impartial review of highly
emotional cases which involve not only basic human rights but
also basic human emotions. Additionally, you can do far better
in a court proceeding which is impartial, organized, and ruled
by precedent and established rules of procedure than you can
from an administrative proceeding composed of a group of
people who are responsible to no one except the person who
appointed them-largely in the executive department-or who
been appointed as part of the staff of the agency itmay3 have
9
self.

In an attempt to break a filibuster, Senator Javits and Senator
Williams, the manager of S.2515, the cease-and-desist bill, offered
what was described as a compromise amendment. The proposal
would have permitted the Commission to make findings and recommendations in a disputed case but also would have allowed an
aggrieved party to have such findings and recommendations reviewed by a federal district court. 40 The Javits-Williams amendment provided that proceedings before the Commission would be
conducted in accordance with rules of procedure which "conform
insofar as possible with the Federal Rules of Court Procedure for
Senator Dominick critithe district courts of the United States.'
cized the Javits-Williams proposal for permitting too much judi36. Id at 1003-05. Ultimately the Senate adopted another court-enforcement amendment authored by Senator Dominick. Id at 1557.
37. id at 1002-03.
38. See note 36 supra.
39. Id at 1485.
40. Id at 1383-92, 1394-95, 1407.
41. Id at 1386. Senator Javits explained the intended effect of his amendment:
The last item, which I think bears repetition-in terms of this comparison, is
that the rules of evidence applicable in district courts apply to the EEOC hearings. That is provided by the bill [S. 2515] now. Under our amendment not only
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cial discretion in the application of the federal rules of procedure.
He argued that pretrial discovery, which the proposal failed to secure, was necessary for employers to defend themselves adequately.4 2
A clear indication of congressional intent is found in the comments of Senator Ervin which were made subsequent to the adoption by the Senate of the Dominick amendment:
As a result of about five separate rollcall votes and many
days of debate, some Senators, who on the first votes apparently had no concept of what a rank prostitution of the judicial
process this bill was, joined those of us who were opposed to
making the agency a judge in its own case, and we adopted the
Dominick amendment, which frees Americans involved in controversies with the EEOC from having the EEOC be the prosecutor, the judge, and I might add the executioner. Now they
are assured of being able to get a hearing according to the rules
of procedure and evidence by which the rights of all other persons are judged in the courts of our land, and before impartial
judges rather than biased crusaders.4 3
C. Remarks of Senator Japits
Those courts that have made an effort to examine the legislative history of the 1972 amendments have attached special significance to certain remarks that Senator Javits made after the
Senate's adoption of the Dominick amendment. These remarks
were made in the course of the debate concerning the issue of
whether the authority to bring section 707 pattern or practice suits
should be transferred from the Attorney General to the Commission. Senator Javits noted that the Attorney General's pattern and
practice suits were essentially class actions.' He also noted that
under the court-enforcement approach the Commission would be
the rules of evidence, but the rules of civil procedure, which are applicable in the
district courts, will be applicable to the EEOC procedures.
Id at 1429.
42. Senator Dominick feared that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would not be
applied under the Javits-Williams proposal:
Whereas S. 2515 provides that the federal rules of evidence shall apply "so far
as practicable," amendment 787 [sic] states that the proceedings be conducted in
conformity with rules of evidence and that the rules of procedure apply "insofar
as possible"-a judge factor which practically speaking will probably make inapplicable the most important federal rules of procedure-those of pretrial discovery. Adequate pretrial discovery safeguards respondents from the probability of
entering hearings inadequately prepared to defend themselves against Commission charges.
Id. at 1444.
43. Id at 1661.
44. Id at 1588-90.
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afforded the opportunity to bring class actions pursuant to the
provisions of rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Since there was no reason why two agencies should be empowered
to perform the same functions, he asserted that the authority to
bring section 706 and 707 actions should be consolidated in the
EEOC.45 Thus, in the course of making this argument, Senator
Javits' reference to rule 23 clearly demonstrated that he understood that the rule would apply to actions brought by the EEOC
under section 706.46
The court of appeals concluded in Holmes that Senator Javits'
comments meant that Congress did not intend to exempt the
Commission's section 706 actions from the provisions of rule 23. 47
45. Id
46. Senator Javits remarked.
One other point which it seems to me is absolutely decisive is that the EEOC,
under the Dominick amendment, has the authority to institute exactly the same
actions that the Department of Justice does under pattern and practice. These are
essentially class actions, and if they can sue for an individual claimant, then they
can sue for a group of claimants.
It seems to me that this is provided for by the rules of civil procedure in the
Federal courts, and also it is inherent in the amendment which we adopted.
Under those circumstances it seems to me that this amendment is conclusively
dealt with, and whatever may have been the argument which might have obtained in respect of cease-and-desist orders and the desire to retain this jurisdiction in the Department of Justice when the Commission was going to proceed by
cease-and-desist order rather than by suit, has now given way to the fact that the
Commission can only proceed by suit. And if it proceeds by suit, then it can
proceed by class suit. If it proceeds by class suit, it is in the position of doing
exactly what the Department of Justice does in pattern and practice suits.
I have referred to the rules of civil procedure. I now refer specifically to Rule
23 of those rules, which is entitled "Class Actions" and which give the opportunity to engage in the Federal court in class actions by properly suing parties. We
ourselves have given permission to the EEOC to be a properly suing party.
Id at 1589-90.
47. 556 F.2d at 794 n. 1, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 384 n.l I. See notes 15-16 Supra
and accompanying text. The court of appeals also relied on a portion of the section-bysection analysis prepared by Senator Williams concerning the bill adopted by the Senate.
Of the section which would permit the EEOC to bring lawsuits in district courts, Senator
Williams stated inter alia.
In establishing the enforcement provisions under this subsection and subsection 706(f) generally, it is not intended that any of the provisions contained
therein are designed to affect the present use of class action lawsuits under Title
VII in conjunction with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
courts have been particularly cognizant of the fact that claims under Title VII
involve the vindication of a major public interest, and that any action under the
Act involves considerations beyond those raised by the individualclaimant. As a
consequence, the leading cases in this area to date have recognized that Title VII
claims are necessarily class action complaints and that, accordingly, it is not necessary that each individual entitled to relief under the claim be named in the
original charge or in the claim for relief.
EEOA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 1773 (emphasis added). See also id. at
1847. This commentary can be given only limited significance in interpreting congressional
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The district courts which decided EEOC v. kphirlpool Corp.4 8 and
EEOC v. General Telephone Co.,49 as well as the EEOC itself,5"
have drawn a different conclusion from the Senator's remarks.
In its petition for certiorari in Holmes, the EEOC argued that
it was clear from the context of Senator Javits' remarks that he
was "referring to Rule 23 class actions merely as an analogy to the
Commission's Section 706 jurisdiction ..
."I1 The Commission
cited Whirlpool and General Telephone as support for its argument. In Whir ool, the court said that Senator Javits' remarks
were made to demonstrate that the type of suit which may be
brought under section 707 is virtually the same as that which may
be brought under section 706.52 The court also said that his remarks were made to illustrate the breadth of the Commission's
53
enforcement power by comparing it to a class action.
While Senator Javits' comments were made in the context of
comparing section 706 and section 707 actions, 54 this context does
not alter the meaning of the Senator's words. In the course of
comparing actions brought under the two sections, Senator Javits
stated that, with the adoption of the Dominick amendment, the
EEOC had been made a "properly suing party" within the meaning of rule 23 and could now bring class actions as "provided for
by the rules of civil procedures in the Federal courts."5 5
A different argument was set forth in General Telephone. In
that case, the court adopted the magistrate's report in which the
magistrate had stated, in effect, that the 1972 amendments had
made sections 706 and 707 essentially the same, that the Attorney
General had never been required to comply with rule 23 in bringing section 707 actions, and that therefore Congress must not have
intended that rule 23 would apply to section 706 actions brought
intent concerning the application of rule 23 to Commission suits. In directing his remarks
to the "present" use of class actions by "individual claimants," Senator Williams appears to
have referred only to private class actions since only that type was permitted under § 706 at
the time his remarks were made. Only his statement that "Title VII claims are necessarily
class action complaints" can be said, because of its literal breadth, to contain any implications concerning Commission suits, and any such implications are limited by the context in
which the phrase is found.
48. 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 932, 937 (N.D. Ind. 1978). See note 18 supra.
49. 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 476, 478 (W.D. Wash. 1977).
50. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 20, at 15 n.7.
51. Id
52. 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 937.
53. Id
54. See notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text.
55. EEOA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 1589-90.
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by the EEOC. 56 In his recommendation the magistrate placed
particular reliance upon one paragraph of Senator Javits' remarks. 57 However, the magistrate did not explain how this excerpt supported his own argument. The absence of such
explanation is understandable since in that paragraph Senator Javits made reference to the EEOC having been made a "properly
suing party" within the meaning of rule 23.
The short, but sufficient, response to the magistrate's reliance
upon the comments of Senator Javits is that a fair reading of the
Senator's remarks reveals a contemplation that EEOC section 706
suits would be subject to rule 23. Such was obviously Senator Javits' understanding, regardless of the status of the law which then
existed with respect to rule 23 and section 707 actions. And, as
5 8 and will be discussed further,59
has been demonstrated earlier
such was also the contemplation of many other congressmen.
Furthermore, neither Senator Javits nor any other congressman
made any reference during the legislative proceedings to the past
application, or lack thereof, of rule 23 to section 707 suits. References were made to pattern or practice decisions, but such references were directed to the question of whether, in view of the
Attorney General's record in the prosecution of section 707 actions, such authority should be transferred to the EEOC.60
The section-by-section analysis of the Conference Committee
bill which was prepared by Senators Williams and Javits did say
that "[i]n any area where the new law does not address itself, or in
any areas where a specific contrary intention is not indicated, it
was assumed that the present case law as developed by the courts
would continue to govern the applicability and construction of Title VII."' 1 Of course, in 1972 when title VII was amended, there
was no "present case law" concerning the application of rule 23 to
56. 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 478. See also EEOC v. Singer Controls Co. of
America, 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 309, 310 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
57. 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 478. The magistrate accorded special significance to
the following comment of Senator Javits:
I have referred to the rules of civil procedure. I now refer specifically to rule 23 of
those rules, which is entitled "Class Actions" and which give the opportunity to
engage in the Federal court in class actions by properly suing parties. We ourselves have given permission to the EEOC to be a properly suing party.
EEOA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 1590. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
58. See notes 21-43 supra and accompanying text.
59. See notes 79-106 infra and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., EEOA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 73-74, 125, 588,
1574-88, 1592-93.
61. Id at 1844.
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EEOC section 706 actions. Nor was there any case law concerning the application of rule 23 to section 707 actions. As of 1972,
neither the decisions cited by the magistrate in his report nor any
other reported decision had expressly addressed the question of
whether section 707 actions are subject to rule 23.62 With the exception of United States v. Ironworkers Local 86,63 none of the
section 707 decisions cited by the magistrate in GeneralTelephone
could possibly have been within the contemplation of the congressmen who amended title VII in 1972 since all these decisions
were decided subsequent to 1972.64
In IronworkersLocal 86, the Attorney General brought a pattern or practice lawsuit against five building construction unions
and three joint apprenticeship and training committees associated
with the unions. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
made no mention of rule 23. It did, however, deny the appellants'
contention that the provisions of rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure should not govern the court's review of the district
court's findings of fact.65 The implication of this holding is obvious and does not comport with the theory of the magistrate; if one
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applies to an action, then
presumably so should any others which by their terms are pertinent.
62. It might be argued that, in effect, the federal courts had decided as of 1972 the
question of the applicability of rule 23 to § 707 actions. Rule 23(c)(1) required the court to
determine as soon as practicable after the commencement of the action whether it is to be
maintained as a class action. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1). This provision has been interpreted
as imposing upon the court the duty to make such determination regardless of whether a
party has requested it. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 310, 10 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 239, 247 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 431 U.S. 951, 14 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 1686 (1977); Garrett v. Hamtramck, 503 F.2d 1236, 1243 (6th Cir. 1974). Thus, the
failure of a court to act could be regarded as a determination of the issue. However, the
duty imposed by rule 23(c)(1) is limited by its terms to actions which have been "brought as
a class action." Therefore, it is questionable whether § 707 actions brought by the Attorney
General would fall within the purview of this paragraph of the rule since it is doubtful that
the Attorney General ever denominated any of its actions a "class action." In any event,
the far more important consideration concerning the question of congressional intent is the
fact that no court had made any express determination concerning the applicability of rule
23 to § 707 actions as of the time of the 1972 title VII amendments.
63. 443 F.2d 544, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 496 (9th Cir. 1971).
64. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 14 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 1514 (1977); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 11
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 167 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944, 12 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 1090 (1976); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 5 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 587 (5th Cir. 1973).
65. 443 F.2d at 548-49, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 499-500. The appellants argued
that rule 52(a) should not apply because the district court had relied heavily on documentary evidence and depositions and very little on demeanor evidence.
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided two of the other
section 707 cases cited by the magistrate in General Telephone. In
United States v. Georgia Power Co.,66 a pattern or practice suit
had been consolidated for trial with two private class actions.
Neither the application of rule 23 nor of any other rule of procedure was in issue or was even mentioned by the court in this case.
In UnitedStates v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries,Inc.,67 certain appellants attacked the provisions of consent decrees which had
been filed simultaneously with the filing of a complaint by the Attorney General against nine steel companies and the United Steelworkers. The court analyzed the right of the appellants to
intervene in this action not only in terms of the provisions of title
VII but also in terms of the provisions of rule 24 of the Federal
Rules.68 The court also relied upon the provisions of rule 19 in
concluding that the appellants were not indispensable parties to
the action.6 9 In Allegheny-Ludlum, the court did, as indicated by
the magistrate in his report, make specific reference to rule 23.70
That reference, however, provides no real support for the magis-

trate's theory. In concluding its discussion of the appellants' joinder arguments, the court stated that the appellants' real objective
was to convert a government pattern or practice action into a rule
23 class action.7 1 The court's comment may have constituted a
recognition of a distinction between the two types of action; however, it certainly cannot be deemed to have constituted a holding
that rule 23 should not have been applied to the government suit
66. 474 F.2d 906, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 587 (5th Cir. 1973).
67. 517 F.2d 826, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 167 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
944, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1090 (1976).
68. In the words of the court, "Logical analysis of any question concerning intervention in federal court begins with Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 517
F.2d at 840, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 177.
69. Id at 876-77, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 206-07. In a footnote the court quoted
in full the text of rule 19. Id at 876 n.79, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 206-07 n.79. The last
paragraph of rule 19 states, "This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 23." FED. R.
Civ. P. 19(d). This cross-reference indicates the inappropriateness of selectively applying
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
70. 517 F.2d at 877, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 207.
71. The court stated:
Actually, any further consideration of appellants' theory in terms of joinder of
parties becomes hopelessly distorted and unproductive. It appears to us--though
again the argument is utterly vague and conclusory-that their real objective is to
convert what began as a government "pattern or practice" suit into an eventual
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 class action. Under Rule 23(a) one or more members of a class
may initiate a class action when, interalia "(1) the class is so numerous thatjoinder
ofall members isimpracticable.... This criterion is consistent with the scope
in which appellants purport to prosecute these appeals ....
Id (emphasis in original).
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in the first place.7 2 In fact, the court specifically declined to rule
upon the question of whether the action should have been certified as a class action.73 And, in any event, the court of appeals
had not decided Allegheny-Ludlum when Congress was debating
the 1972 amendments.
The final case cited by the magistrate was the 1977 decision of
the Supreme Court in InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States.7 4 It did not address the applicability of rule 23 to
section 707 actions. It did, however, refer to the "affected class"
and its three "subclasses" for whom relief was sought,75 and relied
upon rule 19 in determining that the union could remain a party
to the lawsuit. 76 This case, like the others cited by the magistrate,
provides no support for the theory that congressional intent regarding the application of rule 23 to section 706 actions can be
drawn from the fact that prior to 1972 rule 23 had not been applied to section 707 actions.
D. References in the Amended Statute to
Rules of Civil Procedure
Senator Javits' remarks do not constitute the final factor which
should be examined in determining Congress' intent concerning
the rule 23 issue. Perhaps the clearest indication of congressional
intent that the Rules of Civil Procedure would apply to suits
brought by the Commission under section 706 is the action Congress took with respect to the application of rule 53 to Commission actions. In 1972, Congress added the following subsection to
amended section 706:
It shall be the duty of the judge designated pursuant to this
subsection to assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date and to cause the case to be in every way expedited. If
such judge has not scheduled the case for trial within one hundred and twenty days after issue has been joined, that judge
may appoint a master pursuant to rule 53 of the Federal Rules
72. Of course, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals did indicate in Holmes that it believes that § 707 actions are not subject to the provisions of rule 23. See text accompanying
note 16 supra.
73. The court made clear that it "need not delve into a labyrinthian search for the

answer to whether the district court somehow erred in failing to certify the proceedings
below as a class action before finally entering the decrees, for no one has briefed or argued
the point in exactly those terms." 517 F.2d at 878, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 208.
74. 431 U.S. 324, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1514 (1977).
75. Id at 332, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1517-18.
76. Id at 356 n.43, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1527 n.43.
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of Civil Procedure.
This provision was inserted by Congress in order to relax the rule
53 restrictions on the appointment of special masters.7 8
Consideration of the rule 53 matter began with a colloquy between Senator Dominick and Senator Javits. The exchange was
inspired by Senator Javits' comment that, under the amendment
to S. 2515 which Senator Williams and he had proposed, the
EEOC would act in the manner of a special master or referee.7 9
Senator Dominick then asked Senator Javits what his reaction
would be if language were added to the Dominick amendment
that would sanction the appointment by district courts of hearing
examiners or special masters to determine facts.80 Senator Javits
responded that he believed that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures already permitted such appointments but that the courts did
not in fact make them.8 Later in the debates, Senator Dominick
argued on behalf of his court-enforcement amendment that if a
federal court faced delay in hearing an EEOC case because of its
caseload, it could expedite matters by appointing, pursuant to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a hearing examiner to hear the
82
case.
After the adoption of the Dominick amendment, Senator Javits offered another amendment to S. 2515 which provided that if
a title VII action had been pending for more than 120 days after
the joining of issues without the case having been scheduled for
trial, the court would be required to appoint a special master to
hear the case pursuant to rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.8 3 The amendment was modified to make the appointment of a master discretionary with the trial court. It was then
adopted by the Senate and ultimately by the Conference Committee.8 4 Senator Javits explained that this amendment was designed
to relax the provisions of rule 53 which preclude the appointment
77. EEOA § 4(0(5), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f(5)(1976) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

(0(5) (1970)).
78. FeD. R. Civ. P. 53(b) provides:
A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. In actions to be
tried by a jury, reference shall be made only when the issues are complicated; in
actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of account and difficult computation of damages, a reference shall be made only upon a showing that some
exceptional condition requires it.
79. EEOA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 1428.
80. Id
81. Id
82. Id at 1540.
83. Id at 1675-76, 1683, 1730-31.
84. Id at 1731, 1817.
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of masters except in most unusual cases."
This congressional action is of great significance to the rule 23
issue because it demonstrates that Congress contemplated that the
Federal Rules would apply to EEOC actions, as well as to other
civil rights actions. Moreover, Congress deemed it necessary to
qualify the application of the provisions of one of the rules to title
VII actions. It can only be concluded that had Congress intended
that rule 23 not apply to Commission suits, it would have taken
similar action with respect to rule 23.
In one other instance, Congress did take similar action. Senator Williams offered an amendment which would permit aggrieved persons to intervene in civil actions brought by the EEOC
or the Attorney General.8 6 Senator Williams explained that while
it was likely that an individual would have such right of intervention under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, he felt that it was
necessary to make clear the existence of this right. 87 The Senate
adopted Senator Williams' amendment8 8 and ultimately it was incorporated into the 1972 amendments.8 9 Thus, here too Congress
took affirmative action to ensure that the provisions of a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure did not conflict with the purposes of the
amendments.
The magistrate noted in General Telephone that the 1972
amendments specifically require the EEOC to comply with rule
6590 when seeking a temporary restraining order or a preliminary
injunction. 9' Yet Congress made no reference to EEOC compliance with rule 23. Therefore, he reasoned, Congress did not intend that the EEOC should comply with rule 23.92
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id at 1731, 1848.
Id at 1669.
Id at 1670.
Id
Id at 1847, 1900.
FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
Section 706(0(2) of the 1972 amendments provides in pertinent part:
Whenever a charge is filed with the Commission and the Commission concludes on the basis of a preliminary investigation that prompt judicial action is
necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act, the Commission. . . may bring an
action for appropriate temporary or preliminary relief pending final disposition of
such charge. Any temporary restraining order or other granting preliminary or
temporary relief shall be issued in accordance with rule 65 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
EEOA § 4(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2)(1976) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2)
(1970)).
92. The magistrate stated:
Had Congress intended the Commission to be bound by Rule 23, the requirement
should have been expressed in the statute. Congress saw fit to specifically require
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There was no recorded debate in either house concerning the
reference to rule 65, and the section-by-section analysis of the
amendments sheds no light on the rationale for the reference.
Thus, it simply is not clear why Congress referred to rule 65 in the
1972 amendments. An examination of the compromises made
during the legislative process may provide, however, an explanation for the reference to rule 65. The Joint Explanatory Statement
of Managers at the Conference on H.R. 1746 summarized the proposals made during the course of the legislative proceedings concerning the pertinent subsection in the following manner:
The Senate amendment authorized the Commission or the
Attorney General to seek preliminary injunctive relief. The
House bill authorized the Commission to seek preliminary relief and required a showing that substantial and irreparable injury to the aggrieved party would be unavoidable. The Senate
receded with an amendment that authorizes the Commission or
the Attorney General to seek preliminary injunctive relief and
a provision that Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce93
dure should govern all actions brought under this subsection.
The House bill contained limitations upon the right to obtain
temporary injunctive relief which appear to have exceeded the
limitations recognized under traditional principles of equity. 94 On
the other hand, the Senate bill simply provided that whenever
necessary to carry out the purposes of title VII, the Commission,
or the Attorney General in a case involving a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision could "bring an action for
appropriate temporary or preliminary relief pending final disposition of such charge. ' 95 In view of the differences between the
the EEOC to comply with the provisions of Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in connection with obtaining temporary or preliminary injunction relief under § 706(f)(2), but made no reference to compliance with Rule 23. The
most reasonable conclusion to be drawn is that Congress did not intend to require
the EEOC to comply with Rule 23.
EEOC v. General Tel. Co., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 476, 479 (W.D. Wash. 1977).
93. EEOA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 1816. See id at 331.
94. Neither the proposed requirement that the aggrieved party's injury be "substantial" nor the requirement that it be "unavoidable" is among the traditional prerequisites for
granting injunctive relief. See, e.g., Boys Mkts. Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398
U.S. 235 (1970), in which the Supreme Court indicated that the "ordinary principles of
equity" which must be scrutinized are "whether breaches are occurring and will continue,
or have been threatened and will be committed; whether they have caused or will cause
irreparable injury to the employer, and whether the employer will suffer more from the
denial of an injunction than will the union from its issuance." Id at 254. Arguably at
least, "irreparable" injury is not necessarily the same as "substantial" and "unavoidable"
injury since the House bill contained all three words. EEOA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 21, at 331.
95. Id at 1782.
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House and Senate versions, the conferees may have found the
traditional, familiar limitations contained in rule 65 to be an acceptable compromise. Moreover, the conferees may have felt that
specific reference to rule 65 was a convenient and efficient method
of setting forth the terms of the compromise which they had
reached. 6 In any event, the scant attention paid this provision by
Congressmen provides a compelling reason for declining to attach
any significance to its inclusion. This is especially true in view of
the fact that there exist so many other clear indications of congressional intent concerning rule 23 contrary to that discerned by the
magistrate in General Telephone.
E. Absence of Reference in the Amended Statute to Rule 23
The discussion in the preceding section suggests that the
significance, if any, which should be accorded Congress' failure to
mention specifically rule 23 in the text of the 1972 amendments
should be considered in a broader context. In other words, should
congressional silence be regarded as a conscious failure to exempt
the EEOC from compliance, as the courts in Holmes and EEOC v.
Akron National Bank & Trust Co.9 7 concluded, or as absence of
any intention to require compliance, as the magistrate concluded
in General Telephone.98 The courts' conclusion is more reasonable. To conclude otherwise is to conclude also that Congress intended that only those Federal Rules specifically mentioned in
title VII should be deemed applicable to Commission actions.
Certainly Congress did not attempt to list in the statute each of the
eighty-six Federal Rules which it intended would apply to any
particular Commission action.
It is reasonable to presume that Congress was aware, at the
time the 1972 amendments were drafted, of the general applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to all civil actions. 99
96. Finally, in view of the specific limitation contained in rule 65(e), Congress may
have wished to dispel any doubt about the applicability of rule 65. Rule 65(e) states that
"[t]hese rules do not modify any statute of the United States relating to temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions in actions affecting employer and employee ..
" FED. R. Civ. P. 65(e).
97. 78 F.R.D. 684, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 636 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
98. See notes 56 & 57 supra. Rule 23 is not limited by its terms to the application to
any particular type of plaintiff or defendant who is a party to a class action. See note 12
sup.pa.

99. The rules, as amended from time to time, have been prescribed by the Supreme
Court and submitted to Congress for its review and possible action. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 10001-10007 (1969). 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1976) provides in pertinent part:
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Rule 1 states that the "rules govern the procedure in the United
States district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity or in admiralty, with the exceptions
stated in Rule 81."100 The language of this rule has remained essentially the same since the promulgation of the Federal Rules in
1938.101 The rule 81 exceptions do not include any category that
could be deemed to exempt civil rights actions brought by the
United States or any of its agencies from coverage by the Federal
03
Rules. 0 2 Nor has rule 81 ever contained such an exception.1
Moreover, the applicability of the Federal Rules to actions in
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules ... the
practice and procedure of the district courts and courts of appeals of the United
States in civil actions ...
Such rules shall not take effect until they have been reported to Congress....
* .* Nothing in this title, anything therein to the contrary notwithstanding,
shall in any way limit, supersede, or repeal any such rules heretofore prescribed
by the Supreme Court.
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
101. See4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supranote99, § 1011, at 68-69.
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(l)-(6) provides in pertinent part:
(a) To What Proceedings Applicable.
(I) These rules do not apply to prize proceedings in admiralty [or] to proceedings in bankruptcy or proceedings in copyright. . . .They do not apply to
mental health proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.
(2) These rules are applicable to proceedings for admission to citizenship,
habeas corpus, and quo warranto, to the extent that the practice in such proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the United States and has heretofore conformed
to the practice in civil actions ...
(3) In proceedings under Title 9,U.S.C. relating to arbitration, or under...
Title 45, § 159, relating to boards of arbitration of railway labor disputes, these
rules apply only to the extent that matters of procedure are not provided for in
those statutes. These rules apply to proceedings to compel the giving of testimony
or production of documents in accordance with a subpoena issued by an officer or
agency of the United States under any statute of the United States except as
otherwise provided by statute or by rules of the district court or by order of the
court in the proceedings.
(4) These rules do not alter the methods prescribed by [designated statutes]
. . .for instituting proceedings in the United States district courts to review orders of the Secretary of Agriculture [or] of the Secretary of the Interior [or] of
petroleum control boards; but the conduct of such proceedings in the district
courts shall be made to conform to these rules as far as applicable.
(5) These rules do not alter the practice in the United States district courts
prescribed. . . for beginning and conducting proceedings to enforce orders of the
National Labor Relations Board; and in respects not covered by those statutes,
the practice in the district courts shall conform to these rules so far as applicable.
(6) These rules apply to proceedings for enforcement or review of compension orders under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
. . . except to the extent that matters of procedure are provided for in that Act.
The provisions for service by publication and for answer in proceedings to cancel
certificates of citizenship. . . remain in effect.
103. See 7 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 81.01[l], at 81-89 (2d ed. 1978).
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which the United States is a party is clearly indicated by a number
of specific references to the United States in the Rules themselves.
For example, rule 4(d)(4) provides for personal service of summons upon the United States, rule 12(a) specifies that an answer
must be served by the United States within sixty days after service
of summons and complaint, and rule 55(e) forbids the granting of
against the United States except upon proof of
a default judgment
04
the claim.1
Finally, as was pointed out earlier with respect to the application of rule 53 to Commission actions' 0 5 and as was noted by the
court in Holmes,10 6 Congress certainly knows how to establish exemptions from the Federal Rules. It did not do so with respect to
the application of rule 23 to section 706 actions brought by the
Commission. It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude, for this reason as well as the others discussed previously, that Congress intended that rule 23 would apply to such actions.
F. Frustrationof CongressionalIntent
Before concluding the discussion of congressional intent, an
argument made by two district courts should be noted. In General
Telephone and in EEOC v. Schlueter Manufacturing Co.,' 1 7 the
courts based their decisions, at least in part, on the premise that
application of rule 23 to Commission actions would frustrate Congress' intent to strengthen the enforcement provisions of title
VII.' °8 The courts confused a matter of degree with one of kind.
104. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 13(d), 15(c), 25(d), 37(f), 39(c), 45(c), 54(d), 62(e), 65(c),
69(b).
Federal courts had held prior to 1971 that the United States and its agencies are subject
to the Federal Rules just as are any other litigants who are properly before federal courts.
See, e.g., United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1958); Mitchell v.
Bass, 252 F.2d 513, 517 (8th Cir. 1958). The courts had also held prior to 1971 that § 706
actions brought by private persons on behalf of themselves and other individuals were
subject to the provisions of rule 23. See, e.g., Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Co., 398 F.2d 496,
499, 1 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 328, 330 (5th Cir. 1968). Rule 23 is not limited by its terms to
the application to any particular type of plaintiff or defendant who is a party to a class
action. See note 12 supra.
105. See text accompanying notes 77-86 supra.
106. In Holmes, the court of appeals noted that since 1973, proceedings under the
Bankruptcy Act have been conducted under special rules of procedure promulgated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1976). 556 F.2d at 795 n.12, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 384 n.12.
See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
107. 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 53 (E.D. Mo. 1978).
108. In General Telephone the court reasoned:
It seems unlikely that Congress would expand the enforcement power of the
EEOC by giving it the right to sue, and then restrict it to the procedures available
prior to the amendments. If the EEOC were bound by Rule 23, then its enforce-
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As mentioned earlier, 0 9 the dominant issue of the 1971-72 debates was whether the EEOC should be granted enforcement powers by according it the authority to issue cease-and-desist orders or
by enabling it to sue in federal district court. The use of either
mechanism would have increased the EEOC's enforcement power
since previously it was authorized only to institute actions to compel compliance with court orders. Thus, even though the application of rule 23 to Commission actions would place some
limitations upon the prosecution of such actions, it would not frustrate Congress' purpose of increasing the Commission's enforcement powers. The Commission would still be empowered to bring
class actions in all instances that it deems appropriate and that are
otherwise appropriate in light of the provisions of rule 23, as liberally interpreted in title VII actions."1 0 Prior to 1972, the Commission could not have brought any enforcement actions, and it could
not have sought to remedy any violations of title VII left uncorrected by private individuals and the Attorney General. Moreover, the EEOC can now bring to bear in an initial action the
agency's considerable expertise and resources, factors which often
are absent in actions brought by private individuals.
Supporters of the cease-and-desist approach realized that
granting the EEOC court-enforcement powers would strengthen
title VII. They also recognized that the enforcement process
would be subject to limitations which they had sought to avoid.
Senator Williams remarked, in a statement preceding the sectionby-section analysis of the 1972 amendments, that the court-enforcement "process may be somewhat slower and more cumbersome than the cease-and-desist procedure which we originally
sought. But, in the final analysis, I most firmly believe that we
will get the desired enforcement."'' In the House, Congressman
O'Hara asserted that the Erlenborn court-enforcement bill offered
ment power would be no greater than that of any individual, and the 1972
changes would be meaningless.
16 Fair Empl.Prac. Cas. at 479. In Schlueter Manufacturing,the court similarly concluded:
"Chief among the stated reasons for the various amendments was Congress' belief that the
then existing enforcement provisions of Title VII were inadequate. Requiring the Commission to seek class certification prior to being able to seek relief in the public interest would
clearly frustrate this purpose." 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 54 (citation omitted).
109. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
110. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1127, 2 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 231, 235 (5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold, J., concurring); Lamphere v. Brown
Univ., 71 F.R.D. 641, 650 (D.R.I. 1975), appeal dimissed,553 F.2d 714 (1st Cir. 1977).
111. EEOA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 1843.
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aggrieved parties no rights they did not already possess. 1 2 The
House, however, was not persuaded and adopted the Erlenborn
bill.
In effect, General Telephone and Schleuter Manufacturing repeated the argument made by Congressman O'Hara. " 3 Making
this argument is tantamount to asserting that since Congress intended to give the EEOC enforcement powers by giving it the
right to sue in federal court, Congress must necessarily have also
intended that such actions would not be subject to any of the limitations or guidelines which are normally applied to civil suits.
The shortcomings of this argument are apparent.
III.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE APPLICATION

OF RULE

23 TO SECTION 706 ACTIONS BROUGHT BY
THE EEOC

The inquiry concerning the application of rule 23 to section
706 actions brought by the EEOC might reasonably be concluded
by deciding that Congress intended that rule 23 would apply to
such actions. While congressional will is usually determinative of
such an issue, an examination of relevant policy arguments is also
important. Contrary to assertions made by the EEOC and several
courts, there are no substantial reasons why rule 23 should not be
applied to Commission actions. Indeed, there are good reasons
why the provisions of the rule should be applied.
A.

Class Membership

In Holmes, the EEOC argued that it could never satisfy the
requirement of rule 23 that the representative of the class be a
member of the class."1 4 Such an inability would, so the theory
goes, prevent the Commission from bringing any section 706 enforcement actions. This argument is apparently buttressed by a
literal application of language found in the Supreme Court's deci112. Id at 263-64.
113. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
114. 556 F.2d at 792, 796, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 382, 386; Petition for Rehearing
and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc by the Appellant Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission at 4-6, EEOC v. D.H. Holmes Co., (5th Cir. 1977) [hereinafter cited as EEOC
Petition for Rehearing]. Several district courts have agreed with the Commission's argu-

ment. EEOC v. Akron Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 78 F.R.D. 684, 688 (N.D. Ohio 1978);
EEOC v. Whirlpool Corp., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 932 (N.D. Ind. 1978); EEOC v. General Tel. Co., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 476 (W.D. Wash. 1977); EEOC v. Pinkerton's, Inc.,
14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1431 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
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sion in East Texas Motor FreightSystem, Inc. v. Rodriquez.II5 In
that case the Court held, in part, that the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals had erred in certifying a private class action because the
named plaintiffs had not suffered the alleged discrimination.
Since they were not members of the class they purported to represent, the named plaintiffs were not proper class representatives
under rule 23.16
In Holmes, the court of appeals responded to the Commission's argument concerning class membership by reasoning that
since Congress had given the Commission standing to sue, the
Commission was a real party in interest, and thus for purposes of
rule 23, was a member of the class."' The court also reasoned
that it would be anomalous to hold that an enforcement agency
such as the EEOC could never satisfy the membership requirement of rule 23 when earlier cases had held that certain private
organizations, although technically not members of a class, had
satisfied this requirement." 8
In EEOC v. Whirlpool Corp., 19 the district court agreed with
the conclusion of Holmes that the amended language of section
706 had given the Commission standing to sue and had made the
Commission a real party in interest. However, the court did not
agree that the Commission could satisfy the requirement of class
115. 431 U.S. 395, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1505 (1977).
116. The Court in East Texas noted that the plaintiffs "were not members of the class
of discriminatees they purported to represent. As this Court has repeatedly held, a class
representative must be part of the class and 'possess the same interest and suffer the same
injury' as the class members." Id at 403, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1508.
117. 556 F.2d at 795-96, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 386. The Holmes court emphasized that Congress itself had "conferred standing on EEOC. Congress has thus determined that EEOC does sufficiently 'possess the same interest and suffer the same injury' as
the class members for whom it would sue." Id at 796 n.16, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 386
n.16. The district court in PageEngineeringCo. also relied on this rationale in concluding
that the EEOC should be deemed a class member for the purposes of rule 23. 17 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1638, 1640 (N.D. I11. 1978).
118. 556 F.2d at 796-97, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 386. Holmes cited Smith v. Board
of Educ., 365 F.2d 770, 777 (8th Cir. 1966) and Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 937 (2d Cir. 1968).
Other decisions not cited in Holmes in which courts have rejected the argument that the
class representative is not a technical member of the class include Thompson v. Board of
Educ., 71 F.R.D. 398, 404 (W.D. Mich. 1976); U.S. v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 71
F.R.D. 10, 16 (D. Nev. 1975); Undergraduate Student Ass'n v. Peltason, 359 F. Supp. 320,
321 (N.D. Ili. 1973). See Harriss v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24 (N.D. Cal. 1977);
National Hairdressers & Cosmetdlogists' Ass'n v. Philadelphia Co., 7 Fed. R. Serv.
17a.151, Case 1 (D. Del. 1943).
119. 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 932 (N.D. Ind. 1978).
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membership. 120 In reaching this determination, the court in
Whirlpool distinguished two cases relied upon in Holmes.- Smith v.
Boardof Education'2 t and Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk RedevelopmentAgency.' 22 According to the Whirlpool court, these cases involved only the issue of standing and not whether organizations
that technically are not members of a class can nonetheless act as
class representatives. 123 The assessment of these decisions by the
Whirlpool court is in error.
Smith v. Board of Education was a civil rights action brought
by the Arkansas Teachers Association (ATA) and an individual
teacher. 24 Justice (then Judge) Blackmun wrote for the court:
[T]o argue that ATA here is not a member of the class for
which relief is sought, is, we think, but another way of arguing
the question whether ATA is a real party in interest. Having
held that ATA is a proper party in this latter respect, we think it
it is not to be dismissed from the case because of
follows that125
Rule 23(a).
Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency was a class
action suit brought under rule 23 by the Norwalk, Connecticut
chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality, two tenant associations, and eight individuals. 26 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals felt that "the reasons for requiring an individual plaintiff in
a class action to be a member of the class do not necessarily preclude an association from representing a class where its raison
d'etre is to represent the interests of that class."' 2 7 The court declined to decide the question of the association's standing since it
appeared to the court that the individual plaintiffs could12 adequately represent the interests of all members of the class.'
In concluding that the EEOC cannot be a member of a class
within the meaning of rule 23, the Whirlpool court relied upon
Local 194, Retail, Wholesale andDepartment Store Union v. Standard Brands, Inc.' 29 In that case the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that a union bringing a civil rights action on
behalf of its members has standing only to seek injunctive or de120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id at 935, 940.
365 F.2d 770, 9 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1081 (8th Cir. 1966).
395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 938.
365 F.2d at 773, 9 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1082.
Id at 777, 9 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1085 (citation omitted).
395 F.2d at 923.
Id at 937. Professors Wright and Miller agree with this view. See note 137 infra.
Id at 937-38.
540 F.2d 864, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 499 (7th Cir. 1976).
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claratory relief and that such an action is not governed by the provisions of rule 23.130 After reaching the latter conclusion, the
court observed that "an organization suing solely as a representative of one or more of its members would be unable to meet all the
requirements of Rule 23, if those requirements were read literally.
It is not a member of the class of persons whose rights are to be
vindicated ... "3
No real significance concerning the application of rule 23 to
EEOC lawsuits can be drawn from the court's conclusion. The
court emphasized that the union had standing to seek only prospective, noncompensatory relief on behalf of its members. A declaratory or injunctive suit brought by a union differs markedly
from a damage suit brought by the EEOC or by a private class. 132
Thus, the analogy drawn by the Whirlpool court is not apt, and
the court's reliance on Local 194 is inappropriate.
The view adopted by the court in Holmes concerning the
EEOC's ability to be a member of a class is more reasonable and
less technical than that espoused in Whirlpool. There is no room
for doubt that Congress provided the Commission with standing
to sue under section 706.133 Nor is there any doubt that the EEOC
is a real party in interest within the meaning of rule 17(a)' 34 when
it initiates section 706 actions. 35 Furthermore, since Congress in130. The court based this holding upon the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (An organization which has not suffered monetary
injury has no standing to recover damages for its individual members but does have standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief.).
131. 540 F.2d at 867, 13 Fair EmpL Prac. Cas. at 502.
132. The former action is much like an action brought by a single individual on his
own behalf since the practical effect of injunctive or delaratory relief is likely to be the
same whether sought on behalf of one or many individuals. See EEOC v. D.H. Holmes
Co., 556 F.2d 787, 793, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 378, 383 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,436
U.S. 962, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1000 (1978) and cases cited therein; EEOC v. Datapoint
Corp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1133, 1134 (W.D. Tex. 1975), af 'dinpart,570 F.2d 1264,
17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 281 (5th Cir. 1978); Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F. Supp. 1320 (M.D.
Ala. 1973). Thus, the application of rule 23 is not required to ensure the economical use of
judicial and private resources.
133. See text accompanying note 119 supra. Even the court in Whirlpool agreed that
such was the case. 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 935. Congress may confer standing to sue
"even where the plaintiff would have suffered no judicially cognizable injury in the absence
of statute." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975).
134. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) provides in part:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. . . .[A]
party authorized by statute may sue in his own name without joining with him the
party for whose benefit the action is brought; and when a statute of the United
States so provides, an action for the use or benefit of another shall be brought in
the name of the United States.
135. As previously noted, even the Whirlpool court recognized that the EEOC is a real
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tended that the EEOC would be a "properly suing" party within
the meaning of rule 23 when it brings section 706 actions, 136 it
would serve the purposes of both rule 23 and title VII to hold that
the EEOC is a member of a class within the meaning of rule
23(a).

137

B.

Adequacy of Representation

In addition to asserting the class membership argument, the
EEOC has also argued that since its purpose in bringing suit is to
represent the public interest, it must be excused from compliance
with the requirements of rule 23.138 A number of district courts
have concluded that because the EEOC does represent the public
interest, it cannot qualify as an adequate class representative
within the meaning of rule 23(a)(4). 13 These courts have reasoned that the public interest which the EEOC represents as a
party in interest. 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 935. See note 119 supra and accompanying
text.
136. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
137. See EEOC v. Delaware Trust Co., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1521, 1526 (D. Del.
1979).
Professors Wright and Miller have concluded that the approach used by the Eighth
Circuit in Smith v. Boardof Education-focusingupon the existence of standing and status
as a real party in interest in resolving the issue of class membership-is the proper one:
This approach seems sound inasmuch as the primary consideration should be
whether the party can adequately represent the interests of the class. Once adequacy of representation and standing are established, the action should not be
defeated because of the technical point that an organization, which is the real
party in interest, is not a member itself.
7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 99, § 1761, at 591-92.

138. FED.R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) provides: "(A) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or
more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only
if. . .(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class." The EEOC argues that it cannot meet this prerequisite: For example, "a private
party typically seeks an award of backpay for purposes of restitution; the EEOC, by contrast, may well seek backpay in section 706 proceeding principally to serve the public purpose by giving employers the 'incentive to shun practices of dubious legality."' Petition for
Certiorari, supra note 20, at 10-11 (quoting Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
417-18 (1975)). See EEOC v. Delaware Trust Co., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1521 (D. Del.
1979); EEOC v. Akron Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 78 F.R.D. 684, 686, 17 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 636, 638 (N.D. Ohio 1978); EEOC Petition for Rehearing, supra note 114, at 2-4.
139. EEOC v. Akron Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 8 F.R.D. 684, 688, 17 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 636, 639-40 (N.D. Ohio 1978); EEOC v. Whirlpool Corp., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
932, 935 (N.D. Ind. 1978); EEOC v. General Tel. Co., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 476, 479
(W.D. Wash. 1977).
Other decisions in which courts have relied at least in part upon some form of this
"public purpose" argument in holding that the EEOC need not comply with rule 23 include EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 206 (D. Md. 1978);
EEOC v. Pinkerton's Inc., 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1431 (W.D. Pa. 1977); EEOC v. CTS,
13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 852 (W.D. N.C. 1976); EEOC v. Vinnell-Dravo-Lockheed-Man-

RULE 23 IN EEOC ACTIONS

complainant may conflict with the private interests of the aggrieved individuals involved in the suit; that is, the EEOC may be
more concerned with broad injunctive and affirmative relief affecting future compliance with title VII than with140the redress of
injuries already suffered by individual employees.
Courts have noted several factors that may demonstrate a divergence of public and private interests in title VII actions. First,
Congress granted the EEOC and private plaintiffs the right to intervene in one another's section 706 actions. This legislative action may reflect congressional opinion that the interests of the
EEOC and private plaintiffs are not coextensive.' 4 1 Second, some
courts have held that private individuals are not bound by judgments obtained in suits brought by the EEOC.' 42 Finally, where a
private party has filed an action, the EEOC has been permitted to
file a separate action when the scope of its complaint is broader
43
than that of the private party.'
While indeed there may be both public and private interests
involved in section 706 actions, any conflict between the two
seems more theoretical than real and is unlikely ever to render the
EEOC a less than adequate representative under rule 23(a)(4). In
the context of an actual prosecution by the EEOC of a section 706
action, there is no reason why the EEOC's interest in obtaining
broad, affirmative relief would be inconsistent with efforts to obtain backpay, whether for deterrence or restitution, for aggrieved
nix, 417 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Wash. 1975); and EEOC v. Lutheran Hosp., 10 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 1177 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
140. EEOC v. Whirlpool Corp., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 932, 935 (N.D. Ind. 1978);
EEOC v. General Tel. Co., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 476, 479 (W.D. Wash. 1977). In
Rodriguez v. East Tex. Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1246 (5th Cir.
1974), rev'don olhergrounds,431 U.S. 395, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1505 (1977), the court
noted that although "the Government may be willing to compromise in order to gain
prompt, and perhaps nationwide, relief, private plaintiffs, more concerned with full compensation for class members, may be willing to hold out for full restitution." 505 F.2d at
66, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1266.
141. EEOC V. Akron Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 78 F.R.D. 684, 688, 17 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 636, 640 (N.D. Ohio 1978); EEOC v. Whirlpool Corp., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 932,
936 (N.D. Ind. 1978).
142. See EEOC v. Whirlpool Corp., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 932, 936 (N.D. Ind.
1978); EEOC v. General Tel. Co., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 476,479 (W.D. Wash. 1977). In
addition, § 706(f)(1) provides that without a party's consent, the EEOC's consent to a conciliation agreement cannot bind that party. EEOA § 706(0(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5()(l)
(1976); see Petition for Certiorari, supra note 20, at 13-14.
143. EEOC V. Whirlpool Corp., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 932, 936 (N.D. Ind. 1978).
See also EEOC V. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 535 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1976), aj7'd, 432 U.S.
355 (1977); EEOC v. Kimberly Clark, 511 F.2d 1352 (6th Cir. 1975); EEOC v. General
Elec., 532 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1976).
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individuals." In the context of an attempt by the EEOC to settle
a section 706 action, the provisions of rule 23(e) require the district court to insure that neither public nor private interests are
unfairly compromised by a settlement.' 4 5
As a practical matter, the public and private interests involved
in a section 706 action invariably coincide. The EEOC decides
whether to initiate its actions by examining activities which it believes have resulted in injuries to specific groups of employees. 4 6
Moreover, for years private plaintiffs have maintained class actions under section 706 that have vindicated not only individual
interests but also, according to the courts, important public interests as well. 147 Thus, the courts have concluded that such private
plaintiffs are capable of adequately representing both private and
public interests.
The antagonism that will defeat a claim of representative status is antagonism that goes to the very subject matter of the litigation.' 48 That level of antagonism does not exist between the
144. If, after 1972, there does remain any meaningful distinction between §§ 706 and
707, see text accompanying note 227-32 infra, then it is that § 706 is still designed primarily
to redress individualrights. See EEOC v. Continental Oil Co., 548 F.2d 884, 887 (10th Cir.
1977); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 843, 11 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 167, 179 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,425 U.S. 826, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1090
(1976). Insofar as monetary relief is sought for individuals, even a § 707 "pattern or practice" suit is a "private" and not a "public" lawsuit. United States v. Georgia Power Co.,
474 F.2d 906, 923, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 587, 599 (5th Cir. 1973).
145. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) provides that a "class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs."
Section 1.46 of the Manualfor Complex Litigation advises courts of the inquiries which
should be made in determining whether a proposed settlement is fair and reasonable and
states that "Rule 23(e) makes the court the protector of the rights of absent class members."
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, § 1.46, at 61 (1978).

If

the requirements of rule 23(e) would compel the EEOC to consider interests of aggrieved
persons which it would otherwise ignore, making some settlements more difficult to
achieve, the difficulties would be justified by the broad, remedial purposes of the statute
itself.
146. Even in targeting employers for § 707 "pattern or practice" actions, the EEOC
looks to the effect of employment practices upon groups of employees. See 28 DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) A-5 (Feb. 8, 1979); 56 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-6 (Mar. 22, 1978).
147. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45, 7 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 81, 84 (1975); Local 194, Retail, Wholesale and Dep't Store Union v. Standard
Brands, Inc., 540 F.2d 864, 866, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 499, 500 (7th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 848, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 167,
183 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,425 U.S. 944 (1976); Karan v. Nabisco, Inc., 17 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 507, 511 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Wilhite v. South Cent. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 426 F.
Supp. 61, 63 (E.D. La. 1976).
148. See, e.g., Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 414 F.2d 311, 317 (1st Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970); Redmond v. Commerce Trust Co., 144 F.2d 140, 151
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interest in obtaining broad injunctive relief and the interest in recovering backpay as restitution for victims of discrimination. The
interests of the representative and the members of the class need
not be identical; they need only share common objectives and legal or factual positions. 149 Moreover, the interests of the representative may go beyond those of the class without being in conflict
with those of the class.' 5 0
The main consideration in determining the adequacy of representation under rule 23(a)(4) is the forthrightness and vigor with
which the representative of the class can be expected to defend the
interests of the members of the class. 15 ' While the EEOC may be
concerned with protecting a public interest when it brings a section 706 action seeking backpay for aggrieved individuals, that
motive does not prevent it from representing aggrieved individu152
als with the requisite forthrightness and vigor.
In Holmes, the court stated that the question of the adequacy
of the EEOC's representation is a question of fact that should be
"resolved in the trial court in the usual manner."' 15 3 Other courts
reaching the same conclusion have held that the EEOC should not
be deemed a less than adequate representative as a matter of law
merely because it represents public as well as private interests.
Rather, the question of the EEOC's adequacy as the representa154
tive of a class should be decided on a case-by-case basis.
Such an approach is reasonable and proper. There simply is
(8th Cir. 1944), cert. denied,323 U.S. 776 (1944); Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 71 F.R.D. 641,
650 (D.R.I. 1976), appeal dismissed, 553 F.2d 714 (1st Cir. 1977); 7 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 99, § 1768, at 639.
149. See, e.g., Russell v. American Tobacco Co., 528 F.2d 357, 365 (4th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied,425 U.S. 935 (1976); Fujita v. Sumitomo Bank, 70 F.R.D. 406, 410-11 (N.D. Cal.
1975); Fertig v. Blue Cross, 68 F.R.D 53, 57 (N.D. Iowa 1974); Zarate v. State Dep't of
Health & Rehabilitative Serv., 347 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Feder v. Harrington, 52
F.R.D. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 99, § 1769, at 655.
1972); First Am.
150. Bucha v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69,72 (N.D. Ill.
Corp. v. Foster, 51 F.R.D. 248, 250 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
151. E.g., Mearsay v. First Republic Corp., 43 F.R.D. 465, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); 7 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 99, § 1768, at 646-47.
152. See generally 7 C. WRIGHT & A MILLER, supra note 99, § 1768, at 647.
153. EEOC v. D.H. Holmes Co., 556 F.2d 787, 797, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 378, 386
(5th Cir. 1977).
154. A district court took this position in EEOC v. Page Eng'r Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 1638, 1640 (N.D. IIL. 1978). In Harris v. Anaconda Aluminum Co., 17 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 181 (N.D. Ga. 1978), the EEOC successfully complied with rule 23 in a decision
rendered subsequent to Holmes by a district court sitting within the Fifth Circuit. The
defendant employer contended that neither the EEOC nor the individual plaintiffs would
be adequate representatives of the class. The district court noted a portion of the comments
of the appeals court in Holmes and then concluded that "thus far" the EEOC had aggres-
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no justification for concluding as a matter of law that the EEOC
can never adequately represent the interests of a class. If in a particular instance, a district court does perceive potential antagonism between the EEOC and a class of aggrieved employees, it
can conduct a hearing to determine the extent and significance of
any such antagonism and can weigh it against the vigor and expertise with which the EEOC can be expected to pursue the interests of the class. Even if a court discerns actual antagonism, it
may be able to employ the provisions of rule 23(c)(4) and (d)'"156to
tailor the action and minimize the effects of the antagonism.'
C.

Impediments to Enforcement Efforts

The EEOC has argued that its enforcement efforts will be hindered if the requirements of rule 23 are applied to section 706
actions. Specifically, the EEOC has pointed to the numerosity requirement of rule 23(a)(1), 1 7 the typicality requirement of
23(a)(3), 58 and the manageability requirement 59 as potential impediments. A district court has also concluded that the application of rule 23 would occasionally make settlement of EEOC suits
more difficult.' 6 ° Whatever merit these concerns may have, they
are more than offset by the interests served by the application of
rule 23.
sively pursued the litigation, had protected the interests of the class, and therefore would be
permitted to act as class representative in the suit. Id. at 185.
155. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) provides: "When appropriate (A) an action may be
brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may
be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this
rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly." Rule 23(d) provides in pertinent
part: "In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate
orders: . . . (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors;...
(5) dealing with similar procedural matters."
156. See generaly Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968);
Karan v. Nabisco, Inc., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 507, 519 (W.D. Pa. 1978); 7 C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, supra note 99, § 1768; 7A id §§ 1794, 1796.
157. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 20, at 15. For the pertinent text of the rule, see
note 158 infra.
158. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 20, at 14. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) provides that
among the prerequisites to a class action are "(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable. . . [and] (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class ....
159. See notes 189-95 infra and accompanying text; 156 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-l
(Aug. 11, 1976).
160. EEOC v. Whirlpool Corp., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 932, 939 (N.D. Ind. 1978).
See notes 140-145 supra and accompanying text.
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1. The Numerosity Requirement
The Commission has argued that the numerosity requirement
would impede its enforcement efforts because it would be precluded from seeking relief in a section 706 action on behalf of any
group of individuals, with the exception of the charging party or
parties, unless it could demonstrate that joinder of all of the potential plaintiffs would be impractical. 16 The district court in
EEOC v. Whirlpool Corp.'62 supported this view and detailed
what it perceived to be the practical difficulties of imposing the
numerosity requirement:
[I]n cases where the class of aggrieved employees is too small
for that requirement to be met, those discriminatees would as a
practical matter often be left without legal recourse. Because
the Commission would be precluded from representing them,
these discriminatees could join the Commission's suit only if
they retained private counsel. While the Act provides for the
appointment of attorneys at the court's discretion, it is unclear
whether this provision extends beyond private parties -who
bring their own separate Title VII suits. If the provision does
indeed extend to cases where discriminatees seek joinder in a
suit already brought by the Commission, the cost of court-appointed private counsel for each individual discfiminatee seeking joinder will be great. If an employee seeking joinder in a
Commission suit is unable to convince a court that he satisfies
the criteria for court-appointed counsel, relief for that employee may be effectively foreclosed. In many cases the back
pay award due that aggrieved employee will be too small to
warrant retaining private counsel. 163
In order to make its point, the Whirlpool court hypothesized a
very special set of facts. Not only does its example contemplate a
class too small to satisfy the numerosity requirement, but it also
assumes a class of employees who cannot satisfy the statute's criteria for court-appointed attorneys 64 and whose claims are insuffi161. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 20, at 15; see EEOC v. Delaware Trust Co., 18
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1521, 1523 (D. Del. 1979).
162. 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 932 (N.D. Ind. 1978).
163. Id at 939 (citation omitted). The court also took the position that the EEOC
could seek class relief under § 707 without having to comply with the requirements of rule
23.
164. Section 706(f)(1) provides for the appointment by the court of an attorney for a
complainant "in such circumstances as the court may deem just." EEOA § 7(f)(1), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976). The language of the statute provides no basis for the fear
expressed by the court in Whirlpool that, with respect to the appointment of counsel, courts
will distinguish situations involving the joinder of plaintiffs from those in which plaintiffs
initiate separate actions.
There is, however, no automatic right to appointment of counsel in a title VII case.
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cient to warrant retention of private counsel. Rarely would these
circumstances converge in a suit brought by the Commission, and
even if they did, the bringing of such a suit would not be an efficient use of the Commission's enforcement resources. Employees
who cannot satisfy the criteria for court-appointed attorneys and
whose claims do not warrant the retention of counsel have not, at
least in relative terms, suffered serious injury. Furthermore, if the
EEOC chose to prosecute such a case despite these considerations,
it still could obtain the injunctive relief necessary to end any discriminatory practices shown to have existed.' 65
It should also be noted that existing case law provides a basis
for a flexible treatment of the numerosity requirement. First,
there is no set standard for class size that is applied by the courts
in determining whether the class is so numerous as to make joinMoore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1972). The court's discretionary decision
whether to appoint counsel depends on a number of factors, including the merits of the
asserted claim. Although the district court may not refuse to appoint counsel for an employment discrimination claimant solely because the Commission has found no reasonable
basis for the claim, Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1977), it may
be considered as an important factor. Id at 1309. Another factor is the amount of effort
shown by the plaintiff to obtain counsel. Spanos v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 478 F.2d 806
(3d Cir. 1972); Johnson v. Hertz Corp., 316 F. Supp. 961 (S.D. Tex. 1970). Finally, the
district court may properly consider a plaintiffs financial status in assessing the "justness"
of the plaintiffs application for counsel. Edmunds v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 315 F.
Supp. 523 (D. Kan. 1970).
165. If the EEOC's action does not satisfy the numerosity requirement of rule 23, then
the EEOC may be required to join other persons as parties pursuant to the provisions of
rule 19(a). That rule requires that a person must be joined
if (I)in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple,
or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a).
Rule 19(b) lists the factors that must be considered by a court in deciding whether to
proceed without an indispensable person:
[F]irst, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective
provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the
prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the
person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b).
If the Commission's action does not meet the numerosity requirement, a court should
permit the EEOC to represent the individuals upon whose charges its action is based without their joinder, pursuant to rule 17(a). That rule allows "a party authorized by statute
[to] sue in his own name without joining with him the party for whose benefit the action is
brought.
...FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
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der impracticable. Classes consisting of as few as fourteen 166 and
eighteen' 67 members have been held to be sufficient to satisfy rule
23(a)(1). More important, the courts have made it clear that factors other than mere numbers should be considered in determining whether joinder is impracticable. All the circumstances of the
case, including the nature of the cause of actiont 68and the ability
169
of individual litigants to institute actions on their own behalf,
should be considered in determining whether the rule 23(a)(1) requirement is satisfied.
In Harris v. Anaconda Aluminum Co.,' 7 ° a post-Holmes decision by a Fifth Circuit district court, the Commission and the individual plaintiffs sought to represent a class of all present, former,
and future black employees of the defendant company. The Commission claimed that the class consisted of more than 200 persons;
the individual plaintiffs stated that it was comprised of 110 persons.'' The defendant employer contended that the Commission
and two individual plaintiffs had failed to identify a sufficient
number of class members to satisfy the numerosity requirement of
rule 23(a)(1). The defendant relied upon the Commission's apparent inability to name more than twenty class members. 7 2 The
court noted that the decision as to impracticability of joinder depends upon "the particular circumstances of the case rather than
any arbitrary numerical limitation." '73 It concluded that the
166. Manning v. Princeton Consumer Discount Co., 390 F. Supp. 320, 324 (E.D. Pa.
1975), ard on othergrounds, 533 F.2d 102 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 865 (1976).
167. Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648, 9 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1065 (4th Cir. 1967). In Local 246, Utility Workers Union v. Southern
Cal. Edison Co., 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 328 (C.D. Cal. 1969), the court, relying upon its
perceptions of the purposes of civil rights actions and the probability of similar discrimination against future applicants, held that classes comprised of only eight and two identifiable
persons satisfied the numerosity requirements. In Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am.
Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 463 (E.D. Pa. 1968), a class of 25 members satisfied the numerosity requirement.
168. DeMarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 845 (2d Cir. 1968); Cypress v. Newport News
Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648, 9 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. 1065 (4th Cir.
1967); Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Barnes v.
Board of Trustees, 369 F. Supp. 1327, 1333 (W.D. Mich. 1973); Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F.
Supp. 1320, 1325 (M.D. Ala. 1973); Thomas v. Clarke, 54 F.R.D. 245, 250 (D. Minn. 1971).
169. Barnes v. Board of Trustees, 369 F. Supp. 1327, 1333 (W.D. Mich. 1973); Dolgow
v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 99,
§ 1762, at 602; Donelan, Prerequisitesto a Class Action Under Rule 23, 10 B.C. INDUS. &
COM. L. REV.527, 531 (1969).
170. 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 181 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
171. Id at 182 n.3.
172. Id at 183.
173. Id at 184.
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plaintiffs had shown through the allegations of the complaint, statistical admissions of the defendant, and the statements of fourteen individuals interviewed by the Commission that the
complaints of the twenty persons identified were common to other
individuals similarly situated. 7 4 The court's treatment of the
numerosity issue in this case is consistent with the established inclination of federal courts to take a relaxed view of the burden of
demonstrating numerosity.' 7 5
Applying rule 23(a)(1) to EEOC section 706 actions may occasionally create difficulties in the prosecution of such actions that
would not otherwise exist. In such instances, however, the joinder
of all potential title VII plaintiffs who are members of a class not
satisfying the numerosity requirement should be no more difficult
than joinder of comparably sized classes of individuals who seek
to maintain other kinds of civil actions.176 Indeed, joinder should
prove less difficult in title VII cases than in other kinds of actions
since courts have traditionally taken a "liberal" or "remedial"
view of title VII suits. Those instances in which the EEOC's actions do not satisfy rule 23's numerosity requirement are likely to
be rare and certainly will not involve any of the EEOC's major
enforcement efforts. Consequently, no special exemption from the
numerosity requirement is justified.
2.

The Typicality Requirement

The EEOC has expressed concern that the typicality requirement of rule 23(a)(3) 7 7 might restrict it to asserting claims similar
t7 8
to those of the party upon whose charge the action is based.
174. Id
175. See, e.g., Afro Am. Patrolmens League v. Duck, 503 F.2d 294, 298 (6th Cir. 1974);
Jack v. American Linen Supply Co., 498 F.2d 122, 124 (5th Cir. 1974).
176. The members of a class which does not satisfy the numerosity requirement are not
precluded from joining an action brought by the EEOC simply because they have not filed
charges with the EEOC. Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 1 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 328 (5th Cir. 1968). Moreover, it is likely that the courts will deem the title VII
provision concerning appointment of attorneys to be applicable in these situations. See
note 164 supra.
177. The prerequisite is that "the claims or defenses of the representative parties [be]
typical of the claims or defenses of the class.
... FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). See note 158
supra.
178. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 20, at 14. Interestingly, the Commission took
the opposite approach in EEOC v. Delaware Trust Co., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1521,
1525 (D. Del. 1979), arguing that its claims were atypical of any class members because it
represents the public interest.
The typicality requirement of rule 23(a)(3) may result in additional limitations on the
scope of a private class action. Although certain claims may be within the jurisdictional
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The EEOC has argued that it does not merely "stand in the shoes"
of a charging party when it prosecutes a claim.' 7 9 Its argument
should be heeded. The EEOC should, even within the bounds of
rule 23, be permitted to represent interests broader than those that
charging parties can properly represent. Here, the often recited
but usually poorly defined concept of the public interest which the
EEOC serves should be accorded a clear and purposeful meaning.
Whether a section 706 action is brought by an individual or by
the Commission, it must be supported by a charge which has been
filed with the Commission.'8 ° The jurisdictional scope of the action is limited by the reasonably anticipated scope of the EEOC's
investigation, not by the terms of the charge itself.'8 ' The EEOC's
claims should be deemed to be typical of any claims that are
within the jurisdictional scope of the complaint. If the EEOC is
not permitted to represent otherwise appropriate classes whose
claims are within the jurisdictional scope of a title VII action, the
Commission will be doing no more than "standing in the shoes"
of charging parties. In that event its public purpose would be substantially diminished and serious violations of title VII could go
unremedied.
The EEOC's public purpose can be served without impinging
upon the purpose of the typicality requirement. The typicality
provision requires that the claims of the representative party be
similar enough to the claims of the class members to ensure that
the representative party will adequately represent the class members.182 The application of this provision necessitates a comparison of the claims of the representative party with those of the
other members of the class. 8 3 Identification of the EEOC's claims
scope of the action, a private plaintiffwill be precluded by rule 23(a)(3) from representing a
class whose claims are not typical of his own. See Kinsey v. Legg, Mason & Co., 60 F.R.D.
91, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 194 (D.D.C. 1973).
179. The Holmes court stated that: "When EEOC seeks to recover back pay for individuals, it would seem to be Congress' clear intent that EEOC stand in the shoes of those
individuals and represent them in a suit the individuals would otherwise be entitled to
bring." EEOC v. D.H. Holmes, 556 F.2d 787, 796, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 378, 386 (5th
Cir. 1977).
180. EEOA § 4(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5()(1) (1976).
181. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466, 2 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 788, 796 (5th Cir. 1970); EEOC v. Mobil Oil Corp., 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 722, 726
(W.D. Mo. 1973).
182. Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 72 F.R.D. 619, 625 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Sommers v.
Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 66 F.R.D. 581, 587 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Fertig v.
Blue Cross, 68 F.R.D. 53, 57 (N.D. Iowa 1974); Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F. Supp. 1173, 1193
(E.D.N.Y. 1970), aft'don othergrounds,402 U.S. 991 (1971).
183. Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975).
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is not as simple as the identification of the claims of an individual
since the EEOC's claims do not arise from actual injury as do
those of an individual. Thus, other factors must be examined in
order to determine what should be deemed to be the EEOC's
claims.
First, the EEOC clearly "possesses" the claims of the charging
party or parties upon whose charge or charges the EEOC's actions
is based. The EEOC has been given standing by statute to pursue
such claims' 8 4 and should be regarded as the real party in interest
with respect to them. Second, the EEOC has a definite nexus with
and a legitimate interest in all claims that it uncovers during the
course of a proper investigation of a charge of discrimination, regardless of whether such claims are typical of those of the charging party. Congress has assigned to the EEOC the task of
conducting such investigations,' 8 5 and thus it seems appropriate,
at least for the purpose of assessing typicality, to define the claims
of the EEOC as all claims that it uncovers during the course of a
proper investigation.' 8 6 Under such an approach, the EEOC's
claims would be deemed to be typical of all the claims that are
within the jurisdictional scope of the action.187
3.

Manageability
While the EEOC did not express in Holmes its position con-

184. See notes 7 & I I supra.
185. Congress has given the Commission a duty to investigate under § 706. "Whenever
a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved, or by a member of
the Commission ... the Commission ... shall make an investigation thereof." EEOA
§ 4(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976). Section 707 also gives the Commission authority to
investigate. "[Tlhe Commission shall have authority to investigate an act on a charge of a
pattern or practice of discrimination, whether filed by or on behalf of persons claiming to
be aggrieved or by a member of the Commission. Id § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e) (1976).
See also §§ 709, 710, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8,-9 (1976).
186. The EEOC has been permitted to seek relief in § 706 actions with respect to discriminatory conduct other than that alleged by charging parties. See, e.g., EEOC v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1359, 1363 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994
(1975).
187. In EEOC v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., No. 75-1925 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 1978), the
court reached the result urged in the text. A different result was reached in EEOC v.
Brookhaven Bank & Trust Co., No. 76-275 (S.D. Miss., Nov. 10, 1978). Although in Harris v. Anaconda Co., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 181 (N.D. Ga. 1978), the court was not
presented with the issue, it found that the claims of the Commission were "most typical" of
those of the class and certified the Commission rather than two individual plaintiffs as the
representative of the class.
The identification of the EEOC's claims in the manner urged in the text is not inconsistent with the EEOC's wish to represent not only the interests of all persons with claims
within the jurisdictional scope of the action but also the broader public interest.

1979]
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cerning the manageability requirement of rule 23,188 presumably
it shares a view similar to that expressed by the district court in
Stuart v. Hewlett-PackardCo.'8 9 In Stuart, the court permitted
the EEOC to intervene in an action for damages and declaratory
and injunctive relief brought by three women on behalf of themselves and all past, present, and future female employees of the
defendant. The court conditionally declined to certify the class
action brought by the individual plaintiffs. The court determined,
however, that the action should proceed with respect to declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis of the EEOC's complaint
which contained allegations similar to those asserted by the individual plaintiffs. The court also determined that the EEOC
should not have to comply with the provisions of rule 23, reasoning (1) that the primary responsibility for the eradication of discrimination had been assigned by Congress to the "agency
mechanism" rather than to the "class action mechanism" and (2)

that class actions are appropriately utilized only in extraordinary
circumstances. 90° The court expressed particular concern about
the problems of manageability that a class action could present
and concluded that pursuit by the EEOC of injunctive and declaratory relief was a desirable alternative.' 9 1
188. The difficulty of managing a class action is referred to in rule 23 with respect to
the court's determination of whether a (b)(3) action is maintainable. To maintain a (b)(3)
action the court must find that common questions of law or fact predominate and that the
class action "is superior to other available methods [of adjudication] . . . . The matters
pertinent to the findings include... the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Civil rights actions have traditionally
been brought pursuant to rule 23(b)(2) which provides that a class action is maintainable if
"the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to
the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief with respect to the class as a whole.
... Nevertheless, the manageability concept is
relevant to a (b)(2) action as well. Karan v. Nabisco, Inc., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 507,
518 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
189. 66 F.R.D. 73, 9 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9993 (E.D. Mich. 1975). See also EEOC v.
Avco New Idea Div., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 311, 313 (N.D. Ohio 1978). For reference to
the Commission's expression concerning manageability, see 156 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA)
A-I1 (August 11, 1976).
190. 66 F.R.D. at 77-78, 9 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 7138-39.
191. When a party representing the public interest, such as the EEOC in this case,
has been allowed to intervene on the basis of its statutory authority the court
should look to that party, with its expertise and resources, as a viable alternative
to coping with the "manageability" problems inherent in the class action vehicle.
This can be accomplished by letting the EEOC assume the duties of the purported
class representatives and pursue any declaratory or injunctive remedy.
Id at 77-79. The court gave no indication why it limited the EEOC to actions for declaratory or injunctive relief. If the court was responding to concern about the manageability of
an action to recover backpay, its reaction was unnecessarily drastic. Tailoring the action
pursuant to the provisions of rule 23(c)(4), which would permit the EEOC to seek backpay
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Potential sources of problems in the management of class actions are the size of the class, the feasibility of notice, and the adjudication of damage claims of the numerous members of the
class.' 92 Representative treatment is often most needed in thd litigation of those cases which, if brought as individual suits, would
impose a great burden on the party opposing the class as well as
on the judicial system.' 9 3 Thus, the question of manageability
must be resolved by weighing the efficiency which the class action
the administrative complexities which may
would produce against
19 4
arise from its use.
Notwithstanding the court's sentiments in Stuart, the designation of the EEOC as plaintiff in an action does not guarantee in
and of itself that intolerable administrative difficulties will not
arise. Surely actions which are truly unmanageable will remain so
regardless of who represents the class. It seems most unlikely that
the EEOC will contend with any real vigor, or that many courts
would be persuaded, that the EEOC should be permitted to pursue otherwise unmanageable class actions.' 9 5
4. Settlement D!fficulties
The court in EEOC v. Whirlpool Corp. suggested that the application of rule 23 would make settlement more difficult because
the EEOC might have to consider the monetary interests of aggrieved individuals which it might otherwise ignore. 196 The court
overlooked, however, a consideration which portends at least as
much, and probably more, difficulty for the settlement of EEOC
suits-absent the application of rule 23, settlement of an EEOC
on behalf of a manageable class of individuals, would have been more appropriate. See
note 155 supra and accompanying text.
192. 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.45, at 23-370 to 371 (2d ed. 1978).
193. See generally Id § 23.45.
194. Id at 23-374.
195. Important considerations dictate that such actions should not be maintained without at least some modification or restriction by the court:
Only if counsel and the Court can adequately entertain and analyze all of the
issues concerning the whole class can the class interests be protected and the remedial objectives of Title VII be served. Unmanageable cases may not only be a
disservice to Title VII policies and adequate protection of individual class members claims, but they may cause excessive delay in final resolution of the case, to
the prejudice of all involved, and disrupt the judicial economy objectives of the
class action device.
Karan v. Nabisco, Inc., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 507, 518-19 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
196. 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 932, 939 (N.D. Ind. 1978). See notes 140 & 145 supra
and accompanying text.
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action is not binding upon individual employees.197 Any individual employee who is not entitled to relief under the EEOC's settlement or who declines offered relief is free to bring his own action,
including a class action, against the defendant employer. The risk
of facing such actions must in many instances cause prudent employers to doubt whether they can afford to agree to otherwise
acceptable proposals of settlement. These risks and their resultant
chilling effect upon settlement efforts can be avoided when the
provisions of rule 23 are applied and a settlement agreement is
19 8
entered that is binding upon all members of the class.
D. Salutary Purposes of Rule 23
The preceding discussion has highlighted the difficulties that
supposedly may arise because of the application of rule 23 to section 706 actions brought by the EEOC. This section briefly notes
some salutary purposes that would be served by the application of
rule 23 to EEOC class actions. Essentially, these are the same purposes that are served by the application of the rule to private class
actions.
In Holmes, the appellate court stated that rule 23 prevents
piecemeal lawsuits, permits widespread relief, affords a defendant
protection against inconsistent adjudications, and provides a basis
for the judicial control necessary to prevent abuse of the class action mechanism.' 9 9 The court predicted that if the EEOC were
exempted from rule 23, "chaos" could result in the management
of EEOC actions since such matters as notice, exclusion, intervention, dismissal, compromise, and statute of limitations would be
left in question.2" The court noted in the Holmes litigation itself
two sources of potential difficulty. First, more than a year after
the initial complaint had been filed, the defendant still did not
know precisely against whom and upon what grounds it had to
defend. Second, without rule 23, if the EEOC should prevail, it
would be unclear who could recover on a monetary judgment; if
the defendant should prevail, individuals arguably within the af197. Rodriquez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 65, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
1246, 1265 (5th Cir. 1974), revd on other grounds,431 U.S. 345, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
1505 (1977); see Williamson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 468 F.2d 1201, 5 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 204 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 862 (1973).
198.

See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1107, 1130

(1976).
199. 556 F.2d at 795, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 385.
200. Id at 796, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 384. See also EEOC v. Delaware Trust Co.,
18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1521, 1523 (D. Del. 1979).
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fected class would not be precluded from instituting their own
20 1
suits against the defendant.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed similar concerns
in its subsequent decision in EEOC v. Datapoint Corp.202 In this
case the lower court had certified the EEOC as the representative
of a class of persons under rule 23. The Commission had sought
injunctive relief and back pay on behalf of the class, but the district court had found that none of the defendant's practices had
discriminated against the members of the class. On appeal the
Commission contended that the members of the class should not
be bound by the judgment. The court of appeals disagreed. It
stated that to decide the case in the manner urged by the Commission would be inequitable, could result in the litigation of the
same facts and issues in different forums and with different results,
and would waste the resources of both the litigants and the
courts.2 0 3

Doubtless district courts would not permit the chaos forecast
by the Holmes court to occur, even in the absence of the application of rule 23. Nevertheless, two concerns expressed by the
Holmes court, notably the binding effect of judgments and the
provision of fair and adequate notice to defendants, are of particular importance and require the application of rule 23.
The EEOC has attempted to minimize the significance of the
lack of binding effect of judgments when rule 23 is not applied.
The Commission argued in Holmes that in "most circumstances"
aggrieved employees would not be able to bring separate actions
after the Commission's suit had been concluded.20" However,
other than with respect to the charging parties upon whose
charges the Commission's suit is based,20 5 the Commission offered
no basis for its assurances that employers need not be concerned
about exposure to multiple lawsuits. Moreover, in a footnote in its
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,20 6 the Commission cited several
201. Id
202. 570 F.2d 1264, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 281 (5th Cir. 1978).
203. Id at 1268, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 284.
204. The EEOC made this argument in both its Petition for Rehearing before the court
of appeals and its Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. EEOC Petition for Rehearing, supra
note 114, at 10-11; Petition for Certiorari, supra note 20, at 18-19.
205. The Commission noted in its petitions that in McClain v. Wagner Elec. Co., 550
F.2d I 115 (8th Cir. 1977), the court held that when the Commission brings a § 706 suit
based on a charge filed by an individual, that individual has the right to intervene in the
Commission's suit but has no right to bring a separate action.
206. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 20, at 19 n.10.
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cases 2° 7 for the proposition that EEOC suits are not binding on
private parties, and in EEOC v. Datapoint Corp.,2' the Commission argued that an adverse judgment was not binding even upon
the members of the class which it had been certified to represent.
In EEOC v. Whirlpool Corp.,2°9 the district court offered three
reasons why defendants in uncertified Commission actions need
not be concerned about multiple liability even in the absence of
the application of rule 23. First, the court pointed out that no
individual may bring a title VII action unless he has filed a charge
with the Commission within 180 days of the alleged act of discrimination.2 10 This requirement does as a practical matter offer
some protection for defendants, but it is far from the guarantee
against multiple jeopardy provided by the application of rule 23.
The charge requirement prevents the maintenance of an action
only if an individual seeks to bring an action concerning an isolated act of discrimination, such as a discharge, which has occurred at a time beyond the period of limitations. The charge
requirement would not, however, preclude an individual from
bringing a subsequent action if that action seeks to redress a continuing violation of title VII. In such instances the requirement
would serve only to limit the amount of backpay recoverable. 21'
Second, the Whirlpool court suggested that a private party will
rarely be able to file a separate suit and will be limited to intervention except in the unlikely event that the scope of the Commission's suit is narrower than that of the private party.2 12 The court
offered no basis for this conclusion. If its reference to private par207. United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 561 F.2d 313 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United
States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 515 F.2d 826, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 167 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert.denied,425 U.S. 944 (1976); Williamson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 486 F.2d
1201, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 204 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931, 5 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 862 (1973).
208. 570 F.2d 1264, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 281 (5th Cir. 1978).
209. 16 Fair Empl Prac. Cas. 932 (N.D. Ind. 1978).
210. Id at 940. In cases in which an individual has initially instituted proceedings with
a state or local fair employment agency, his charge may be filed with the EEOC within 300
days after the occurrence of the unlawful act or within 30 days of receipt of notice that the
state or local agency has terminated its proceedings, whichever is earlier. EEOA § 4(a), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976).
211. Section 706(g) provides: "Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more
than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission." EEOA § 4(a), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). Since the Commission's suit presumably would have been
based upon a charge filed earlier than that which would support for the individual's suit,
the defendant would be exposed to the risk of greater back pay liability in the Commission's suit than in the individual's action.
212. 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 940.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[
[Vol.
29:343

ties means persons other than charging parties, 21 3 then the court's
conclusion is erroneous. The results of section 707 actions do not
bind private nonparties. t4 There is no reason to believe that the
courts will view the effect of the results of section 706 EEOC suits
any differently-absent, of course, the application of rule 23.215
Finally, the court in Whirlpool suggested that, as a practical
matter, private individuals would rarely file suit when the Commission has already done so. 21 6 The court's speculation may be
correct; it is, however, no substitute for according judgments in
Commission actions binding effect upon all members of the
classes in whose behalf they are brought. Certainty and predictability can be achieved only by the application of rule 23.217
Certification of classes under rule 23 would, as the Holmes
court also noted, enable defendants to know better against whom
and upon what grounds they must defend. The EEOC 8 and at
least two courts2t 9 have argued that the notice of the filing of a
charge which is provided a defendant,22 the reasonable cause determination issued by the EEOC, and the conciliation efforts en213. See note 205 supra.
214. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 841, 11 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944, 12 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. 1090
(1976); Williamson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 468 F.2d 1201, 1203, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
204, 205 (2d Cir. 1972), ceri. denied, 411 U.S. 931, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 862 (1973).
215. See EEOC v. Avco New Idea Div., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 311, 313 (N.D. Ohio
1978); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 198, at 1107.
216. 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 940.
217. See EEOC v. Delaware Trust Co., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1521, 1523-24 (D.
Del. 1979). Rule 23(c)(3) provides that judgments in class actions, whether favorable or
adverse to members of the class, shall "include and describe" the members of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3). If an action satisfies the requirements of rule 23, the parties comply with applicable notice provisions, and the court fairly exercises its powers under rule
23, then it is quite likely that the court's judgment will be given binding effect. 7A C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 99, § 1789. See also Advisory Committee's Note, FED.
R. CIv. P. 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 105-06 (1966). Although title VII actions have traditionally
been certified under rule 23(b)(2) and rule 23 does not by its terms require notice in (b)(2)
class actions, see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 198, at 1107-09, notice may be
provided under the provisions of 23(d)(2). Some courts have concluded that due process
requires such notice. Id See also Harris v. Pan Am. World Airways Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24,44
(N.D. Cal. 1977).
218. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 20, at 18; EEOC Petition for Rehearing, supra
note 114, at 8-9.
219. EEOC v. Singer Controls Co., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 309, 310 (N.D. Ohio
1978); EEOC v. Whirlpool Corp., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 932, 939-40 (N.D. Ind. 1978).
220. See EEOC Form 131, "Notice of Charge of Employment Discrimination (Feb.
1976)." The one-page form gives the following notice of a charge of employment discrimination:
You are hearby notified that a charge of employment discrimination under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e el. seq.,
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gaged in by the EEOC furnish a defendant with sufficient notice
of the scope of the Commission's suit. Such information, however, often provides a defendant with very limited knowledge of
the precise facts and issues subsumed in the Commission's typically broad and general allegations. The notice of the filing of a
charge provides a potential defendant with only the identity of the
charging party, the time the alleged violation occurred, and the
generic classification of the charge. Whether a matter was actually covered by the EEOC's determination of probable cause or by
its conciliation efforts can be very uncertain. Disputes are not unlikely concerning the meaning and scope of language used by the
Commission in its determination letters as well as the content of
any contacts between the Commission and a defendant's representatives during conciliation proceedings. Defendants can use
discovery to clarify this information, but discovery efforts have
often been ineffective because defendants and the Commission
have engaged in protracted discovery struggles with respect to the
timing and specificity of the information that the Commission can
be required to reveal.2" 2 '
Certification of classes under rule 23(c)(1)22 2 would give "clear
definition to the action. '223 As soon as possible after the commencement of a class action, classes and subclasses would be specifically identified and described to the court.224 Application of
the rule to EEOC section 706 actions would adequately notify defendants of the adverse interests 225and would make discovery
more effective and pretrial identification of the issues more feasible.
has been filed against you. Information relating to the date, place, and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice or practices is proved herein.
The information referenced is provided in summary fashion.
221. See, e.g., EEOC v. Carter Carburetor, 76 F.R.D. 143, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 665
(E.D. Mo. 1977), mandamus issued, 577 F.2d 43, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 706 (8th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3459 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1979); EEOC v. Anchor Continental,
Inc., 74 F.R.D. 523 (D.S.C. 1977); EEOC v. Brookhaven Bank & Trust Co., No. 76-275
(S.D. Miss., Nov. 10, 1978; EEOC v. J. M. Smucker Co., No. 76-273 (W.D. Tenn., June 9,
1978) (memorandum and order of magistrate); Petition for Rehearing, supra note 114, at 9.
222. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) requires in part: "As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order
whether it is to be so maintained."
223. Advisory Committee's Note, FED. R. Civ. P. 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 104 (1966); see
EEOC v. Delaware Trust Co. 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1521, 1522, 1524 (D. Del. 1979).
224. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.42, at
31 (1978). See also id. § 1.40.
225. Seegenerally Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24,36 (N.D. Cal.
1978).
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Selective Application of Rules of Procedure

A final policy consideration which weighs in favor of the application of rule 23 to Commission 706 actions is that there is no
basis for the selective application of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to Commission suits. As was demonstrated earlier, the
Rules themselves contain no basis for an exemption of Commission actions from rule 23 and indeed contain clear indications that
the Rules are to be applied to actions brought by the United
States.2 26 While the Commission may find objectionable the application of rule 23 to its actions, it surely would not agree that
other Rules of Procedure, such as those dealing with discovery,
subpoenas, or joinder, should not apply to its lawsuits. There is
no more basis for failing to apply these or any other Federal Rules
which by their terms may apply to Commission actions than there
is for declining to apply rule 23.
IV.

THE APPLICATION OF RULE

23

BROUGHT BY THE

TO SECTION

707

ACTIONS

EEOC

The considerations discussed with respect to whether rule 23
should apply to Commission 706 actions are also pertinent to
whether rule 23 should apply to Commission 707 actions. Their
repetition is not necessary. Rather, the issue in examining the application of rule 23 in the section 707 context is whether, after the
1972 amendments to title VII, there remains a difference between
the purposes of sections 706 and 707 sufficient to warrant different
results with respect to the application of rule 23 to Commission
suits.
When title VII was enacted in 1964, sections 706 and 707 each
had a distinct purpose. Section 706 authorized private persons to
bring suits on their own behalf, or, in effect, on behalf of a class of
persons.22 7 Title VII litigation by an agency of the United States
could be initiated only under section 707 and only by the Attorney
General.2 28 Section 707 authorized the Attorney General to bring
pattern or practice suits, which would seek to eradicate significant,
generalized occurrences of discriminatory action. 2 9 Thus, while
226. See notes 99-104 supra and accompanying text.
227. See, e.g., Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 1 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
328 (5th Cir. 1968).
228. See text accompanying notes 2-6 supra.
229. "[A] pattern or practice would be present only where the denial of rights consists
of something more than an isolated, sporadic incident, but is repeated, routine, or of a
generalized nature." 110 CoNG. REc. 14270 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
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both section 706 class actions and section 707 actions may have
served both public and private purposes, prior to 1972 the government could initiate judicial action and bring its resources and expertise to bear upon discriminatory conduct pursuant only to
section 707.
For all practical purposes this distinction disappeared with the
1972 amendments to title VII. Since that time the EEOC has had
the statutory authority to bring broadly based suits under section
706 as well as pattern or practice suits under section 707.230 After
passage of the Dominick amendment granting the EEOC authority to bring section 706 actions, Senator Williams made the following remarks in support of the amendment that would transfer
section 707 authority to the EEOC:
The EEOC now will have-under the bill as it is at this
moment-jurisdiction to bring discrimination cases before a
Federal district court. There will be no difference between the
cases that the Attorney General can bring under section 707 as
a "pattern and practice" charge and those which the Commission will be able to bring as a result of yesterday's decision to
pattern
give EEOC court enforcement powers. Frankly, the 23
1
and practice section becomes a redundancy in the law.
In essence, Senator Williams stated that there no longer would be
any difference between actions brought by the EEOC under section 706 and those brought by the Attorney General under section
232
707. Senator Javits repeatedly expressed similar sentiments.
See text accompanying notes 7-11 supra.
EEOA LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY, supranote 21, at 1587. Butseeid at 1586 (remarks
Hruska).
Senator Javits remarked:
A pattern or practice suit is, after all, nothing but a broader version involving
more parties in greater depth in terms of length of time and the prevalence of a
given practice than an individual suit....
The question is whether we should perpetuate, when the entire basis for it has
been removed, what would be after this bill becomes law, a bureaucratic anachronism by giving the power to institute suit to two entities, where they both concern
private parties.

230.
231.
of Sen.
232.

One. . . point which it seems to me is absolutely decisive is that the EEOC,
under the Dominick amendment, has the authority to institute exactly the same
actions that the Department of Justice does under pattern and practice. These are
essentially class actions, and if they can sue for an individual claimant, then they
can sue for a group of claimants.
. . . If [the EEOC] proceeds by class suit, it is in the position of doing exactly
what the Department of Justice does in pattern and practice suits.
Therefore. . . we have first the Commission with the authority to act in exactly the same type of case in which the Department of Justice acts. Second, we
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The EEOC has argued, in effect, that the similarity between
sections 706 and 707233 compels the conclusion that rule 23 should
not be applied to Commission 706 actions since it has not been
applied to section 707 actions brought by the Commission.2 3 4
have taken away the cease-and-desist authority and substituted the power to sue
which fully qualifies the Commission to take precisely the action now taken by
the Department of Justice.
Mr. President, in the area in which the Department of Justice will deal with a
Government entity, we leave the right to sue with them. So, to inhibit the transfer
of pattern and practice suits is simply to create two agencies to do the work of
one.
If we inhibit that, we risk complete confusion as both the Commission and the
Attorney General can proceed in exactly the same kind of case.
I have said on a number of occasions in this debate that [the Civil Rights
Act of 1964] was a compromise and that much was given up, especially in respect
of the right of seeking a remedy against discrimination in employment. And one
of the things that was given up was any enforcement authority or the right to sue
by the EEOC that we are trying to repeal now. That is why we felt we had to give
the Attorney General the power to sue in big cases, in class action cases, and in
cases where there was a constant pattern of discrimination directed at individuals
with limited resources whom we were relegating to the courts and who could
hardly be expected to carry such a broad and deep case. We are now changing
that and giving it back to the Commission.
It seems to me that the logical conclusion which follows from that is that the
authority previously given to the Justice Department is no longer necessary.
EEOA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 1588-90. With respect to Senator Javits'
statement that in 1964 the Justice Department was granted § 707 authority as a result of the
elimination of, or as a substitution for, the right of the EEOC to bring suit under what was
to be § 706, see United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 920, 5 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 587, 597 (5th Cir. 1973); 110 CONG. REC. 12595-96, 14220 (1964), reprinledinLEGiSLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3067, 3062.
233. The Commission made this argument in its Petition for Rehearing in the Holmes
litigation:
While Section 706 and 707 are not identical, they have many similarities, particularly since the 1972 amendment to Title VII transferred section 707 litigation authority from the Attorney General to the Commission at the same time it
subjected Section 707 suits to the same procedural requirements as Section 706
suits. Thus, the Commission's litigation authority under either Section 706 or
Section 707 may now be initiated by the filing of a charge by a private party, and
both section 706 and section 707 suits must now be preceded by investigation, a
reasonable cause determination and conciliation. Both types of suits, therefore,
vindicate the public interests in essentially the same manner.
EEOC Petition for Rehearing, supra note 114, at 7-8 (citation and footnote omitted).
In its Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in Holmes, the EEOC indicated that it perceived
a difference between the two sections but that it could accomplish the same purposes with
either section:
Section 707 is reserved for more serious cases involving systemic discrimination
and initiated by a Commissioner's charge. Yet the decision of the court of appeals would force the Commission to resort to Section 707 much more often, even
in cases that the Commission considers more suitable for treatment under Section
706.
Petition for Certiorari, supra note 20, at 19 (citation omitted).
234. The Holmes court concluded that when the EEOC initiated a § 706 action, it had

19791

RULE 23 IN EEOC ACTIONS

Several courts which have held rule 23 inapplicable to Commission section 706 actions have taken positions similar to that of the
EEOC.2 3 5 In EEOC v. Whirlpool Corp., the court adopted the
Commission's argument and concluded that it was erroneous to
distinguish, on the issue of rule 23, between Commission suits
brought under section 706 and section 707.236
Conversely, several courts which found rule 23 applicable to
Commission 706 actions discerned important differences between
sections 706 and 707. In Holmes, the court indicated that if the
EEOC were unable to comply with rule 23 in its section 706 action, it could nonetheless file a new action and protect the same
substantive rights under'section 707.237 In EEOC v. Akron National Bank & Trust Co.,238 the court concluded that while the
EEOC could never satisfy the requirements of rule 23, which did
apply to its section 706 actions, it could seek the same relief in a
section 707 "statutory class action" without having to satisfy rule
23. Finally, in EEOC v. Page EngineeringCo.,239 the court held
that the EEOC should comply with rule 23 when it brings a section 706 action. Since the court perceived an "inherent difference" between sections 706 and 707, it expressly noted that its
to comply with rule 23. The court indicated, however, that if the EEOC initiated a § 707
pattern or practice suit, it need not comply with rule 23. See text accompanying note 15
supra.
235. EEOC v. Singer Controls Co., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 309 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
The court in GeneralTelephone Co. declined to apply rule 23 to a § 706 action, reasoning in
part:
The result of the 1972 amendments was to make the two sections effectively
the same in relation to the enforcement power of the EEOC. Today, the EEOC
may bring suit under either § 706 or § 707, and may seek both injunctive relief in
the form of back pay and retroactive seniority.
Both parties in the case at bar agree that there is no longer any essential difference between § 706 and § 707 suits brought by the EEOC and that the applicability of Rule 23 should be the same under either section. If the EEOC is required to
comply with Rule 23 under § 706, it should also be required to comply with § 707.
EEOC v. General Tel. Co., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 476, 478 (W.D. Wash. 1977).
At least one court has stated that when the EEOC brings a § 707 action, it must follow
the same procedures observed prior to instituting a § 706 action. EEOC v. United Airlines,
Inc., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1592, 1594 (N.D. Ill. 1975). The court also concluded that
the two-year limitation on back pay claims contained in § 706 applied to § 707 actions.
236. 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 937 (N.D. Ind. 1978).
237. 556 F.2d at 792 n.8, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 382 n.8. In United States v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 843, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 167, 179 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1090 (1976), the court discussed its perception of the differences between § 706, and its orientation toward protection
of private rights, and § 707, and its orientation toward protection of public rights. See also
EEOC v. Continental Oil Co., 548 F.2d 884, 887 (10th Cir. 1977).
238. 78 F.R.D. 684, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 636 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
239. 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1638 (N.D. Ili. 1978).
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the issue of whether rule 23 should apply to
decision did not reach
240
a section 707 suit.
The conclusions of the courts in Holmes and Akron National
Bank & Trust Co. are incongruous. The courts concluded in both
cases that the EEOC could obtain the same relief for class members under section 707 that it had sought under section 706. Thus,
the courts effectively demonstrated that the EEOC can accomplish
the same purposes under either section. Yet, without any expressed basis for doing so, both courts concluded that rule 23
should apply to Commission 706 actions but not to Commission
707 actions.
Whether one looks to the legislative history of section 707, the
opinions of courts which have held rule 23 inapplicable to section
706 actions brought by the EEOC, or the opinions of courts which
have held rule 23 applicable to such 706 actions, there is substantial support for the proposition that the rule 23 issue should be
resolved identically for both section 706 and section 707 actions.
For many of the reasons discussed earlier, rule 23 should be applied to section 707 actions as well as to those brought under section 706. There is no basis in the -legislative history of title VII, 24 I
in the language of the statute, or in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for holding otherwise. The application of rule 23 to
section 707 actions will serve the same purposes as were outlined
earlier with respect to section 706 actions and will impose only
those restrictions upon the Commission's enforcement efforts that
are necessary to insure fairness for all parties.
V.

CONCLUSION

The provisions of rule 23 should be applied to Commission
actions that are brought pursuant to either section 706 or section
707. The Federal Rules by their terms govern the procedure in
federal district courts in all civil actions, other than in certain expressly described exceptions. Commission actions are not among
such exceptions.
240. Id at 1640.
241. On the contrary, in 1964, as well as in 1972, Congress demonstrated an awareness
of the general applicability of the Rules of Civil Procedure to title VII actions. The Senate
modified language in the House bill in what was to become § 706 of the Act; it removed
House language concerning the appointment of masters, recognizing that the provisions of
rule 53 could cover the subject. See 110 CONG. REC. 8194, 12724, 12814, 12819 (1964),
reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF
1964, at 3268-69, 3007, 3054, 3019.
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There are convincing indications contained in the legislative
history of the 1972 amendments of title VII that Congress intended that rule 23 would govern the class action aspects of section 706 actions brought by the Commission. The same 1972
amendments obviated any distinction between the purposes of
sections 706 and 707 which may have existed previously. Consequently, the two sections should be treated alike insofar as the
application of rule 23 is concerned.
The policy objections to the application of rule 23 that have
been raised by the Commission and some district courts are not
persuasive. The provisions of rule 23, if properly applied, would
not seriously hinder the enforcement efforts of the Commission;
rather, they would serve the same beneficial purposes in Commission class actions as they do in other kinds of class actions.

